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HAUNTING SHADOWS FROM THE RUBBLE
OF ROE'S RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Two years ago seven Supreme Court Justices decided that the right of
privacy included the right to abort. Abortion is still debated, but legally,
it is no longer a debatable issue. The post-Roe debate centers upon the
l(gal, medical and ethical implications of what lies beyond that decision.
If the right of privacy includes the right to abort, does it also include the
right to experiment upon fetuses before and after abortion? Does it in-
clude the right to decide whether the fetus will be killed during the
abortion? What happens when the fetus is born alive after an abortion?
This Note addresses itself to these issues and concludes with a recom-
mendation that Roe's right of privacy remain limited to the abortion
decision.
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 22, 1973, the United States Supreme Court, in Roe v.
Wade, I extended the right of personal privacy to include a woman's
decision to terminate her pregnancy by abortion.2 The Court, how-
ever, did not address itself to the corollary question of whether this
right of personal privacy also encompasses a woman's decision to
terminate or impair life in or ex utero.3 Although Roe attempted to
resolve one constitutional dilemma, it has proven to be a harbinger
of others-fetal experimentation in and ex utero and the phenomenon
of live birth following abortion. The crucial question upon which this
Note focuses is whether the Court's explicit acknowledgment of a
qualified right to abort4 was implicitly coupled with a total abroga-
tion of (a) the rights of the aborted fetus5 and (b) the state's interest
in the fetus both before and after its removal from the uterus. The
basic proposition throughout this Note will be that the right which
Roe bestowed upon pregnant women is specific and limited to re-
moval of the fetus from the uterus.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 153. The Court inferred this right of privacy from the fourteenth amendment
but recognized that it could also be founded in the ninth amendment. Id.
I The term in utero refers to the state of being inside the uterus. The term ex utero
means outside and removed from the uterus. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY
1-43 (12th ed. 1973).
Mr. Justice Blackmun stated "that the right of personal privacy includes the
abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation." 410 U.S. at 154.
1 "Fetus: .... 2. In humans, the child in utero from the third month to birth."
TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY F-16 (12th ed. 1973). Prior to the third month
of pregnancy the fetus is categorized as an embryo. Id. However, throughout this Note,
the term fetus will be used to describe the unborn child from conception until birth.
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II. INITIAL OBSERVATIONS-ROE V. WADE
The gravamen of the appellant's complaint in Roe was that the
Texas.criminal abortion statutes' were constitutionally invalid be-
cause they violated a pregnant woman's right to choose to terminate
her pregnancy.7 Though the Court's decision carried the doctrine of
substantive due process "to lengths few observers had expected"' the
net result was not surprising. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice
Blackmun asserted that the right to privacy which heretofore related
to marriage,9 procreation, " contraception," education 12 and child-
' 410 U.S. at 129. The statutes under attack were TEX. PENAL CODE tit. 15, ch. 9,
arts. 1191-94, 1196 (1961), which read as follows:
Art. 1191. Abortion
If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly
procure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or shall use
towards her any violence or means whatever externally or internally applied, and
thereby procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than
two nor more than five years; if it be done without her consent, the punishment
shall be doubled. By 'abortion' is meant that the life of the fetus or embryo shall
be destroyed in the woman's womb or that a premature birth thereof be caused.
Art. 1192. Furnishing the means
Whoever furnishes the means for procuring an abortion knowing the purpose
intended is guilty as an accomplice.
Art. 1193. Attempt at abortion
If the means used shall fail to produce an abortion, the offender is nevertheless
guilty of an attempt to produce abortion, provided it be shown that such means
were calculated to produce that result, and shall be fined not less than one
hundred nor more than one thousand dollars.
Art. 1194. Murder in producing abortion
If the death of the mother is occasioned by an abortion so produced or by an
attempt to effect the same it is murder.
Art. 1196. By medical advice
Nothing in this chapter applies to an abortion procured or attempted by medi-
cal advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.
410 U.S. at 129.
Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1973). Tribe approves of the principle established by Roe but
disapproves of its Lochner-type direction and maintains that "[olne of the most
curious things about Roe is that, behind its own verbal smokescreen, the substantive
judgment on which it rests is nowhere to be found." Id. at 7.
In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), the Court held that the state's power
to remedy social or economic inequities could not interfere with an individual's four-
teenth amendment due process rights, in this case, the right to freedom of contract.
Id. at 57-59. However, in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), the Court formally
disavowed the Lochner doctrine, stating that "[w]e have returned to the original
constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic
beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies who are elected to pass laws." Id. at 729-
30.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In Loving, the Court considered the constitu-
tionality of a Virginia statute which prohibited miscegenation. Recognizing that mar-
riage is a fundamental freedom, the Court held that a statutory scheme which pro-
scribed interracial marriage was violative of the equal protection and due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 10-12.
,1 In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court invali-
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rearing 3 was now "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy," 14 and that regulation
limiting this right of personal privacy may only be justified by a
compelling state interest. 5
The Court acknowledged that with regard to the abortion decision
the state has two separate and distinct, "important and legitimate"
interests (1) in protecting maternal health and (2) in protecting the
fetus." With a precision that one commentator has associated with
"commissioner's regulations,"' 7 the Court determined at what point
dated a state statute which provided for the sterilization of habitual criminals. Al-
though the invalidation of the statute turned on the issue of equal protection, i.e.,
"white collar" crimes were excluded, there was very strong dicta to the effect that the
right to procreate is a fundamental liberty. Id. at 536. See also id. at 546 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Although privacy is not mentioned in Loving and Skinner, Roe inter-
preted these decisions as extensions of the right of personal privacy. 410 U.S. at 152.
1 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court held
that a Massachusetts statute which permitted married persons to obtain contracep-
tives, but prohibited single persons from receiving them, was violative of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Speaking for the majority, Justice
Brennan opined that the right of privacy must include the right of all persons to be
free from unjustified state intrusion into such fundamental matters as the decision to
bear children. Id. at 453.
12 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), wherein the Court invalidated a
statute which prohibited the teaching of a foreign language in private and public
schools because the statute arbitrarily interfered with the parents' right to educate
their children as they saw fit. The Court recognized that the state had a legitimate
interest in regulating schools and compelling attendance, but held that the regulations
could not be abusive or interfere with the parents' rights without some reasonable
relation to the state. Id. at 399-400.
'1 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), wherein the Court overturned
a state statute which required compulsory attendance at public schools. The Court
held that the act "unreasonably [interfered] with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control." Id. at 534-35.
Although both Meyer and Pierce deal with statutes which were invalidated because
they interfered with personal liberty, both decisions may be viewed as presaging the
broad development of a right of privacy in matters dealing with the rearing and educat-
ing of children.
" 410 U.S. at 153-54.
's Id. at 155. The state's interest in protecting maternal health becomes compelling
during the second trimester of pregnancy. See text accompanying note 19 infra. At the
point of viability, see note 39 infra, the state has a compelling interest in protecting
the fetus. See text accompanying notes 20-21 infra.
"1 410 U.S. at 162. The Court carefully avoided recognizing a state interest in pro-
tecting the life of the fetus, but rather spoke of the state's "interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life." Id.
11 Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
922 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ely]. However, as noted by Professor Ely, "[oln
closer examination . . . the precision proves largely illusory." Id. He states that the
Court failed to deal with the specific responsibility of physicians and failed to ade-
quately define the "permissible scope of health regulations after the first trimester."
Id.
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in pregnancy each interest becomes compelling. During the first
trimester neither state interest is sufficiently compelling to outweigh
the woman's decision to abort."8 When the risks of abortion begin to
exceed those of childbirth in the second trimester, the state may only
impose abortion regulations which have a reasonable relationship to
safeguarding maternal health. 9 However, the interest in protecting
the fetus is not sufficiently compelling to prohibit abortion until at
least the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy. At some point between
the twenty-fourth and twenty-eighth week of pregnancy the state's
interest in protecting the fetus becomes compelling,20 and the state
can then proscribe abortion except when it is necessary to preserve
maternal life or health.'
In order to distinguish the concept of abortion from the concept of
killing, which still remains socially repugnant, the Supreme Court
"1 410 U.S. at 163-65. Under the Court's definition, viability (the stage at which the
fetus can live outside the uterus, DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1713
(25th ed. 1974)) occurs some six to twelve weeks after "quickening," "the first recogniz-
able movement of the fetus in utero." 410 U.S. at 132. The Court concluded that the
state's interest in protecting nonviable fetal life is not sufficiently compelling to out-
weigh a woman's decision to abort in the first trimester. See id. at 163-64.
The rationale behind the Court's selection of viability as the constitutionally critical
issue is unclear, and Professor Ely suggests that on this point "the Court's defense
seems to mistake a definition for a syllogism." Ely, supra note 18, at 924. Additionally,
William J. Curran, Professor of Legal Medicine at Harvard University suggests that
the Court may have erred in assuming that viability can be precisely defined " 'as a
scientifically and philosophically accepted point of demarcation in fetal develop-
ment.'" Washington Post, Apr. 15, 1974, § A, at 14, col. 3.
13 410 U.S. at 163.
Id. at 160.
23 Id. at 163-64. The Court never explained why maternal health takes precedence
over viable fetal life. Recognizing that there exists neither a statutory nor constitu-
tional privilege to take one person's life in order to save one's own, Professor Ely finds
this aspect of the Court's decision as controversial as its viability holding. Ely, supra
note 18, at 921 n.19.
The Court's opinion that during the first trimester the state's interest in protecting
maternal health is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the woman's decision to
abort is based upon national and international medical data indicating that mortality
rates for women undergoing first trimester abortions are less then mortality rates in
normal childbirth. 410 U.S. at 149, 163. But see Brief for Certain Physicians, Professors
and Fellows of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology as Amicus Curiae
at 32-59, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Hilgers, The Medical Hazards of Legally
Induced Abortion in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 57-78 (T. Hilgers & D. Horan eds.
1972); Comment, Expansion of the Right to Privacy Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 19 CATHOLIC LAW. 36, 45 n.80 (1973).
Why the Court could find no state interest in protecting the fetus during the first
trimester is unclear. Though the Court stated that it "need not resolve the difficult
question of when life begins," 410 U.S. at 159, it proceeded to determine when it does
not begin and held that only after the point of viability does the state's interest in




was forced to employ a "schizophrenic sort of subterfuge."22 By the
simple expedient of classifying the fetus as a nonperson, representing
only the potentiality of human life, the Court determined that no
rights are violated by its removal from the uterus." If death results
during removal, it is merely the termination of a potential life which
is undeserving of fourteenth amendment protection.2 One result of
such delphic, albeit necessary rationalization, is what the California
Medical Journal labels "a curious avoidance of the scientific fact,
which everyone really knows, that human life begins at conception
and is continuous whether intra or extrauterine until death."
The Court could have labeled abortion (as it did voting" and inter-
state travel27), a fundamental right. Instead, it preferred to rely on
privacy as a right which, while not unqualified, is broad enough to
encompass the abortion decision.2 1 When couched in terms of privacy,
abortion somehow becomes constitutionally permissible.2 9 Although
n A New Ethic For Medicine and Society, 113 CAL. MED. No. 3 at 67, 68 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as A New Ethic].
" 410 U.S. at 162. The Roe Court recognized the danger inherent in accepting the
appellee's argument that the fetus is a person within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. The appellant's case would have failed "for the fetus' right to life is then
guaranteed specifically by the Amendment." Id. at 157. The Court's conclusion "that
the word 'person' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn,"
id. at 158, resulted from three considerations. First, the appellees failed to cite a case
in support of their proposition. Id. at 157. Second, the Court examined fifteen refer-
ences to the word person in the Constitution and was not convinced that this word
applied to prenatal beings. Id. Finally, the Court noted that legal abortion practices
throughout the nineteenth century were more liberal than they are at present. Id. at
158.
" See id. at 159.
5 A New Ethic, supra note 22, at 68. Obviously, the Court did not agree that such
a consensus exists. Mr. Justice Blackmun opined that the Stoics supported the propo-
sition that life did not begin before birth, and that a great number of persons in the
Jewish and Protestant communities share the same opinion. 410 U.S. at 160.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 544 (1964).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969).
410 U.S. at 154.
Though a right of privacy is not directly mentioned in the Constitution, id. at 152,
this right has emerged through judicial interpretation. The first major discussion of
the need for a right of privacy appeared in Warren & Brandeis, The Right To Privacy,
4 HAxv. L. REv. 193 (1890), and since that time there has been increasing acknowledge-
ment both by judicial decision and legislative enactment that a citizen has certain
rights regarding his or her privacy. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. Ray. 383, 389-
407 (1960).
Beginning with the right to educate one's child, established in Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923), a growing number of marital, familial and sexual decisions
have extended the parameters of the right of privacy. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird,
408 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (right of unmarried persons to use contraceptives); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (right to interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (right of married persons to use contraceptives); Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right to procreate). But cf.
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Justice Blackmun never explained why the right of privacy encom-
passed the decision to abort, he enumerated various conditions which
would inure to the detriment of pregnant women if they were denied
the opportunity to make this decision.
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy
may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the
woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be immi-
nent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is
also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child,
and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases . ..the
additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may
be involved.'
While Roe succeeded in extending the right of personal privacy, it
failed in its initial task of constitutionally resolving without predilec-
tion that which it recognized as a controversial issue.3' Unlike the
reasoning in Griswold v. Connecticut,32 where the Court linked mar-
ried persons' interests in contraception to specific Bill of Rights guar-
antees, no such effort was attempted in Roe.33 However, since the
right recognized in Roe was extended beyond the marital relation-
ship, it is improbable that resort to the Bill of Rights could have
maintained the elasticity of the Court's holding. 4
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding sterilization of insane persons). In
view of this development it is not surprising that the right to abort has been recognized
via the privacy route. See also Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701, 706
(1st Cir. 1973) (right to consensual sterilization), noted in 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 390
(1974).
1 410 U.S. at 153. See also id. at 214 (Douglas, J., concurring), where Mr. Justice
Douglas maintained that giving birth to a child may deprive a woman of her desired
life style. For that matter a cruel and abusive spouse could produce the same effect.
But it is unlikely that the Court would extend the parameters of the right of privacy
to include the killing of one's husband or wife. See Ely, supra note 17, at 932, wherein
the author acknowledges the seriousness of these detriments but opines that they have
"nothing to do with privacy in the Bill of Rights sense or any other the Constitution
suggests." Id. at 932. Additionally, Professor Ely correctly observes that these same
detriments inhere with having an unwanted born child or aged parent around. Id. at
932 n.81.
1' 410 U.S. at 116.
32 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11 See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 75, 82 (1973). See also Ely,
supra note 17, at 932, who suggests that the right recognized in Roe bears no relation
to privacy in the Bill of Rights context; 410 U.S. at 221 (White, J., dissenting), where
Mr. Justice White maintained, "I find nothing in the language or history of the Consti-
tution to support the Court's judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a
new constitutional right for pregnant women . ... "
11 In Griswold, Justice Douglas related the marital relationship to political associa-
tions which are guarded by the penumbrae of the first amendment. Id. at 483. Addi-
tionally, he linked the intimacy of the marital boudoir to those interests protected by
the third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. Id. at 482-86.
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The result in Roe was necessarily achieved by a "marshaling of
values"35 and embodied a preference it sought to avoid. Its balancing
of selected interests resulted in a value judgment in which a woman's
interest in life and health unequivocally outweighed any interest the
state might have in the continued existence of the fetus in utero and
any interest the fetus might have in its own existence in or ex utero.
This initial value judgment provided a firm basis for the Court's
subsequent "role-allocation": 6 Women, not the state, were given ulti-
mate authority to make the abortion decision.
A. Dispelling the Roe Myth
While it may seem that the balance between benefits and harms
differs from trimester to trimester during pregnancy,37 it must be
recognized that Roe is not a trimester-based decision and that the
neatly-carved constitutional triptych is misleading." Pregnancy was
divided into two trimesters and "viability" (the stage at which the
fetus is capable of living outside the womb). 3 If viability occurs be-
3 410 U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice White labelled as a "marshal-
ing of values" the Court's decision to value "the convenience of the pregnant mother
more than the continued existence and development of the life or potential life that
she carries." Id. Mr. Justice White did not indicate whether or not he agreed with such
"marshaling." However, the essence of his dissent is that he found nothing in the
Constitution to support the Court's decision. Id. at 221. He would have preferred that
the legislature, not the Court, resolve the abortion issue. Id. at 222.
See Tribe, supra note 8, at 10.
See 410 U.S. at 164, which reads as follows:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester,
the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses,
regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its interest in
the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother.
11 But see Tribe, supra note 8, at 10, wherein the author observes that Roe is a
trimester-based decision.
410 U.S. at 160, 163. The problem encountered with the concept of viability is not
what that term connotes but when it occurs. Roe first defined viability as that stage
at which the fetus "is, potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with
artificial aid." Id. at 160. Later in its opinion, the Court suggested that viability is that
stage where the fetus "has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's
womb." Id. at 163 (emphasis added). Clearly, the second definition leaves much to be
desired in terms of clarity, for we are left to ponder the epistemological question of
what constitutes "meaningful life"?
Relying on J.W. WILUAMS, OasTmcs 493 (14th ed. L. Hellman & J. Pritchard 1971)
[hereinafter cited as WILLAMS], Mr. Justice Blackmun placed viability at twenty-four
19741
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fore twenty-four weeks, it seems that the state has the authority to
proscribe and regulate abortion in the second as well as the third
trimester. However, for all practical purposes this authority is apoc-
ryphal.
Under Roe, abortion0 is always permissible when a woman's life or
health is at stake." The Court never clearly articulated what it meant
to twenty-eight weeks. 410 U.S. at 160 n.60. However, WILLIAMS states that viability
varies from twenty to twenty-eight weeks. WILIAMS, supra at 493. See D. REID, K.
RYAN, & K. BENIRSCHKE, PRINCIPLES AND MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 255
(1972) [hereinafter cited as REID] (through medical advancement a fetus of 20 weeks
gestation may soon have a greater chance of survival); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
1388 (22d ed. 1972) (fetus of 500 grams and 20 gestational weeks usually considered
viable); TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY A-6 (12th ed. 1973) (fetal weight of
500 grams connotes viability).
In Schlesinger & Allaway, The Combined Effect of Birth Weight and Length of
Gestation on Neonatal Mortality Among Single Premature Births, 15 PEDIATRICS 698
(1955), a statistical analysis conducted by the authors in New York state, exclusive of
New York City, for the years 1949-51, showed 622 live births with a gestational age of
between twenty and twenty-three weeks and an 8.2% survival rate for these births.
In another study of 650,000 live births in New York City, where the gestational age
was calculated from the initial date of the last menstrual period, the following data
was compiled: 20.7% white and 21.7% nonwhite children survived the neonatal period
when born between twenty to twenty-five weeks gestation. Horan, Gorby & Hilgers,
Abortion and the Supreme Court: Death Becomes a Way of Life, in ABORTION AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE 315 (T. Hilgers & D. Horan eds. 1972). In 1968 there were nationwide
968 live births reported under twenty weeks gestation and 18,414 live births reported
between twenty and twenty-seven weeks gestation. Brief for Appellants at 22, Markle
v. Abele, 411 U.S. 940 (1973), citing 1 VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S.
Dept. of HEW, Pub. Health Service, Nat'l Center for Health Statistics, Table 1-43, §
1 - Natality, at 1-41 (1968). See also 1972 THE LANCET 1222-23; WILLIAMS, supra at
680.
,0 Abortion has been variously defined and, as will become evident, it is inappro-
priate to label the termination of pregnancy after viability an abortion. See, e.g., D.
CAVENAUGH & M. TALISMAN, PREMATURITY AND THE OBSTETRICIAN 4 (1969), where abor-
tion is defined as "the expulsion or extraction of all (complete) or any part (incom-
plete) of the product of conception that weighs less than 500 g, alive or dead." See also
J. GREENHILL, OBSTETRICS 265 (13th ed. 1965) ("interruption of pregnancy before the
fetus is viable"); REID, supra note 39, at 254 ("termination of pregnancy before 20
weeks of gestation"); WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 493 (termination of pregnancy when
fetus weighs less than 500 grams); A Statement on Abortion by One Hundred Profes-
sors of Obstetrics, 112 AM. J. OB. & GYN. 992 (1972), where it is stated:
It should be emphasized that abortion is medically defined as the termination of
pregnancy before the end of the twentieth week. Regardless of the wording of a
particular state law, therefore, abortions should not be performed for purely social
reasons beyond this gestational age. Every effort should be made, of course, to
perform abortions before the end of the first trimester.
Id. at 993.
11 410 U.S. at 164. This is true despite the state's power to proscribe post-viability
abortions. Id. at 163-64.
Notwithstanding its recognition that after viability the fetus "has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb," id. at 163, and that after viability there
is both "logical and biological justification" for state regulation protecting fetal life,
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by "health, 42 but it is a word which effectively transcends any au-
thority which might have been given to the state to proscribe post-
viability abortions. Though improbable, it is possible that the psy-
chological and socio-economic conditions which affect health will not
mature until the 280th day of gestation. 3 Thus, even at full term,
women may choose abortion over regular delivery." For this reason,
it is imperative to understand the exact nature and limitations of the
right which Roe bestowed upon pregnant women.
B. The Limits of Roe v. Wade
Roe v. Wade extended a woman's right of personal privacy to in-
clude the right to make the abortion decision-a decision consistently
referred to by Justices Blackmun and Stewart as one to "terminate
pregnancy."45 Because of the various "detriments" created by preg-
nancy, Roe now allows women to decide whether the alleged cause of
those detriments will be removed from their wombs. That, however,
is the extent of the power granted to women by Roe.
id., Roe placed a higher value on maternal life and health. For a discussion of the
rationale behind this aspect of the Court's decision, see note 21 supra.
12 In a concurring opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Burger implied that the term "health"
should be employed in its broadest context. 410 U.S. at 207-08 (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring). Indeed, the list of detriments affecting health stated in the majority opinion, see
text accompanying note 30 supra, coupled with Mr. Justice Douglas' list of detriments
affecting lifestyle, e.g., "to abandon educational plans; to sustain loss of income; to
forego the satisfaction of careers," 410 U.S. at 215 (Douglas, J., concurring), reinforces
Mr. Chief Justice Burger's opinion.
11 The duration of a normal pregnancy is generally about 280 days from the begin-
ning of the last menstrual period. However, if the date of conception is known, and
depending on the length of the menstrual cycle, the usual range of gestation is 266 to
270 days. D. CAVENAUGH & M. TALISMAN, PREMATURITY AND THE OBSTETRICIAN 6 (1969).
11 Delivery is defined as the "[expulsion of the child with placenta and membranes
from the mother at birth." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY D-12 (12th ed.
1973). For all practical purposes the procedures for removal of a viable fetus during
abortion are the same as the procedures used in natural childbirth. For example, the
abortion procedure of hysterotomy is nothing more than a Caesarean section operation.
Id. at H-88. A Caesarean section is defined as "delivery of the infant through incisions
in the abdominal and uterine walls. Incision of the uterus (hysterotomy) is the essence
of the operation .... " WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 1163.
Additionally, "the procedures for removal of a viable fetus typically present the
same risks to the woman whether the fetus is saved or destroyed." Tribe, supra note
8, at 4 n.24. But see Boston Globe, July 25, 1974, at 5, cols. 2-3, wherein Dr. Philip
Stubblefield, an obstetrician at Boston Hospital for Women and a Harvard faculty
member, maintains that there is a procedural difference between a Caesarian section
and an abortion by hysterotomy. The former operation involves saving a fetus pre-
sumed to be viable while the latter involves the removal of a fetus presumed not to be
viable. Under Dr. Stubblefield's definition, a physician performing a hysterotomy
abortion on a viable fetus would presume that it was not viable in order to differentiate
between a Caesarian section and hysterotomy.
,1 E.g., 410 U.S. at 129, 153, 170.
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In Roe the Court conceded the legitimacy of the state's important
interest in protecting potential human life," but because the compet-
ing interest of the pregnant woman's right of personal privacy was
involved,47 the state's interest was subjected to a balancing test.4 1
When a pregnant woman's decision to terminate pregnancy is juxta-
posed with the state's legitimate interest in potential life, the latter
interest does not become compelling until viability is reached."
Roe did not mandate similar results where pregnant women have
made a collateral decision, and the Court's holding thus becomes
significant for what it did not say. It did not say that the right of
privacy was broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to delib-
erately destroy or impair the fetus.
This observation may seem to create a distinction without a differ-
ence, but its significance becomes readily apparent if the fetus can
be separated from the womb by a process which enables it to sur-
vive.5 Though separation may be inextricably linked with destruc-
tion in the first trimester, statistics on live births following abortion
disprove any theory that separation always causes destruction .5
Thus, if this distinction is not made, Roe stands for the proposition
that the right to privacy includes an absolute right to make the feti-
cide decision. Certainly, such an interpretation is not mandated by
the Court's holding.
52
, Id. at 162.
' Id. at 153.
4 See notes 16-21 supra and accompanying text.
' See note 39 supra.
For example, by a hysterotomy method. See note 44 supra.
sl See Kerenyi, Outpatient Intra-amniotic Injection of Hypertonic Saline, 14 CUN.
OB. & GYN. 124, 137 (1971) (detailing accounts of two live births following abortion);
Pakter, Harris, & Nelson, Surveillance of the Abortion Program in New York City:
Preliminary Report, 14 CUN. OB. & GY. 267, 289-90 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Pakter] (26 live births after abortion reported). For additional reports of live births
following saline and prostaglandin abortions, see Symposium - A Report On Prostag-
landins For Abortion, CONTEMPORARY OB. & GN. 83, 102 (Dec. 1973). Prostaglandin
drugs induce abortion by provoking progesterone withdrawal which in turn converts a
normal pregnant uterus into a reactive organ. Id. at 84. In a saline abortion, fluid is
removed from the amniotic cavity and a hypertonic saline solution is injected transab-
dominally. The patient may subsequently be in labor up to seventy-two hours before
the fetus is delivered. It is recommended that this method not be used before the
sixteenth week of pregnancy. 14 CLIN. OB. & GYN. 23, 24 (1971). See also Brief for
Appellants at 28, Markle v. Abele, 411 U.S. 940 (1973), citing BULLET1N ON ABORTON
PROGRAM (Sept. 1972), New York City Dept. of Health, Health Services Admin. at 10.
"' But see Tribe, supra note 8, at 4 & n.24. Although Tribe doubts that the Court
intended to stamp its imprimatur on a feticide decision, he sees a possible justification
for such decision if the mother's mental health requires it.
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III. ABORTION AND DESTRUCTION
A. The Abortion Procedure Decision
That the state's legitimate interest in potential life is affected by
fetal destruction 3 admits of no question. When the fetus is destroyed
during the abortion procedure, "potential life" never reaches its po-
tential. 4 Yet, any discussion of the state's power to proscribe in utero
destruction is entirely dependent upon the progess of birth technol-
ogy. 5 Statistics on live births following abortion demonstrate that
some fetuses can be removed from wombs by procedures which ena-
ble them to survive."6 If birth technology is perfected to such a degree
that all fetuses can be removed from wombs without being destroyed,
a question now only speculative will become frighteningly real: Does
the right of privacy established in Roe confer upon a pregnant woman
the right to select which procedure will be employed in her abortion? 57
Roe fashioned a right of privacy which exists beyond the penum-
bral grasp of the Bill of Rights. It broadened the right to prevent
13 For the purposes of this Note, fetal destruction occurs when the fetus is killed
during the abortion procedure.
According to the Roe Court, "potential life" reaches its "potential" when it is
capable of "meaningful life outside the mother's womb." 410 U.S. at 163.
'" See Human Fetuses Maintained by Artificial Placenta, 7 OB.-GYN. OBSERVER 6
(Sept.-Oct. 1968).
" See R.F.R. GARDNER, ABORTION: THE PERSONAL DILEMMA 215-16 (1972), wherein
the author, a British gynecologist discusses the procedure of abdominal hysterotomy
and a Japanese method using rivanol in which the fetus is always born alive. Of the
195,823 abortions performed in New York during July 1971 through July 1972, approxi-
mately 0.4% (821) were done by the hysterotomy method. Horan, Gorby & Hilgers,
Abortion and the Supreme Court: Death Becomes a Way of Life, in ABORTION AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE 316 (T. Hilgers & D. Horan eds. 1972). See also note 51 supra for figures
on live births following the saline and prostaglandin methods of abortion.
Two methods of abortion with practically no possibility of resulting in live birth are
dilatation and curettage (scraping the fetus out of the uterus), and suction curettage
(vacuum aspiration of the uterus). See Nathanson, Suction Curettage for Early
Abortion, 14 CLIN. OB. & GYN. 99 (1971); Schaefer, Technique of Dilatation and Curet-
tage for Abortion, 14 CLIN. OB. & GYN. 85 (1971).
'3 Some states have enacted legislation which effectively precludes women from
asserting such a right. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-108(3) (Burns Supp. 1973),
providing that "[tihe saline method of abortion shall not be used"; NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-4148 (Supp. 1973), stating that the viability of the unborn child may not be
terminated prior to, during, or following the abortion; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-309
(Supp. 1973), which provides:
If an abortion is performed when the fetus is sufficiently developed to have any
reasonable possibility of survival outside its mother's womb, the medical proce-
dure used must be that procedure which in the medical judgment of the physician
will give such fetus the best chance of survival, and no medical procedure de-
signed to kill or injure such fetus may be used.
See also LA. REV. STAT. § 14:87.1 (Supp. 1974), by which the act of killing a child during
delivery is punishable by imprisonment at hard labor in the penitentiary for life.
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pregnancy, which was recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut5 and
Eisenstadt v. Baird" to include the right to terminate pregnancy. The
question then arises whether the abortion procedure decision is a
logical extension of Roe, as that case was a logical extension of
Griswold and Eisenstadt.
Essential to a response to this question is an understanding of why
Roe granted women the right to decide whether or not to terminate
pregnancy. Justice Blackmun opined that if the state denied women
this choice, carrying a fetus might involve "medically diagnosable"
harm and in other cases, the "stigma of unwed motherhood."' " In
addition, carrying an unwanted fetus might involve "distress" and
"psychological harm."" However, this underlying rationale which
supports a woman's right to make the removal decision, fails to sup-
port a right to decide about destruction, unless, of course, psychologi-
cal harm is imposed upon the pregnant woman if she does not have
the right to destroy. 2 Once the fetus is removed, pregnancy is termi-
nated and the "harms," "stigmas," and "distresses," recognized in
Roe are nonexistent. So long as the abortion is performed, it should
logically make no difference how it is performed. Unless abortion
procedure regulations would be unduly oppressive upon women by
threatening their physical health, they should be considered no less
a legitimate exercise of state police power than are regulations for the
protection of fisheries, forests and wildlife. 3 The same principle that
" 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold the petitioner, the Director of the Planned Par-
enthood League, was convicted under a Connecticut statute which prohibited one from
aiding others in using contraceptives. Her conviction was reversed when the Supreme
Court ruled that the criminal statute involved was unconstitutional. Writing for the
majority, Justice Douglas based his opinion on the penumbral rights theory. He recog-
nized that the Bill of Rights creates certain protected "zones of privacy" which include,
inter alia, privacy in one's home. Id. at 484. Moreover, the enumerated rights of the
Constitution have penumbras, e.g., freedom of association, freedom of inquiry and
those rights peripheral to the fourteenth amendment as exemplified by Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (parents' freedom of choice in educating children
upheld), and its progeny. 381 U.S. at 482-85. Since the enumerated rights have "zones
of privacy," then the nonenumerated penumbral rights are also entitled to this protec-
tive zone. Id. at 481-82. Justice Douglas recognized the marital association as a penum-
bral right, which was entitled to privacy. He concluded that the Connecticut statute
which proscribed the use of contraceptives violated this right of marital privacy. Id.
at 485-86.
59 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Eisenstadt the Court extended the Griswold right of pri-
vacy to include unmarried persons.
00 410 U.S. at 153.
Id.
EZ Cf. Tribe, supra note 8, at 4 n.24.
" See, e.g., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136, 138 (1893) (police power extends to
everything essential to public health and welfare); Ghenovich v. Noerenberg, 346 F.
Supp. 1286, 1291 (D. Alaska 1972) (state exercise of police power over fishing was its
duty); Le Clair v. Swift, 76 F. Supp. 729, 733 (E.D. Wis. 1948) (state as trustee of
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has sustained compulsory vaccination of adult citizens and steriliza-
tion of imbeciles 4 should at least be broad enough to cover prevention
of fetal destruction.
B. State as Parens Patriae
If and when birth technology is perfected to such a degree that all
fetuses can be removed during abortion by procedures which enable
them to survive, and they do survive, it will become necessary to
determine who has a right to their custody and who has responsibility
for their care. As a general rule parents have the right to custody of
their children and the corresponding obligation to provide their chil-
dren with basic necessities. 5 However, parental right to custody is
not without limitation." By virtue of its parens patriae jurisdiction,
which imposes a duty on the state to protect disabled persons who
have no guardian,6 7 the state may curtail parental freedom if the
child's welfare is at stake." Formerly, parens patriae jurisdiction in-
people has duty and right to conserve fish and wildlife). See also Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502, 524 (1933), for a discussion of the state's inherent police power.
"4 In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the Court upheld compulsory
vaccination for smallpox, and in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), it upheld the
sterilization of imbeciles. In each instance, the practices were deemed necessary for
the public welfare.
65 These basic necessities include food, clothing, shelter, medical care and educa-
tion. Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, 556-57, 270 N.E.2d 389, 394 (1971);
Ex parte Crouse, 4 Pa. 9, 11 (1838); Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 97 Pa. Super. 303, 308-
10 (1929). In short, parents have an absolute duty to provide for their offspring. Since
this duty is a public obligation to which criminal and civil sanctions attach, it can be
avoided only under extraordinary circumstances. S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 10
(1972).
11 The origin of parental right to custody is discussed fully in S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS
FAIL 3-13 (1972).
67 Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 522, 171 A.2d 140, 142 (1961). In this case
the court awarded custody of the defendants' unborn child to the welfare department
in order to insure that the child would receive a necessary blood transfusion after birth.
The parents, who were members of the Jehovah Witness sect, had refused to consent
to the necessary blood transfusion on religious grounds. Although the court acknowl-
edged the defendants' first amendment right to practice religion freely, it also recog-
nized the importance of protecting the lives and health of children and held that the
word, "child" in New Jersey's Neglect Statute, included the unborn child of the defen-
dants. Id. at 524, 171 A.2d at 144. The court further held that the unborn child is
entitled to legal protection even if it has not achieved the state of viability. Id.
Early recognition of the doctrine of parens patriae is found in Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 2
P. Wms. 103, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (1722).
"8 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). Traditionally, the courts
have exercised parens patriae jurisdiction over the following categories of children: 1)
children who are accused of violating any federal, state or municipal law; 2) children
who are considered so far beyond parental control that their well-being or that of others
is endangered; 3) children whose parents have abandoned them or who have allegedly
neglected to provide them with support, education or medical care necessary to their
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cluded unborn children. 9 However, the holding in Roe necessarily
renders the viability of this proposition somewhat nebulous.
A pregnant woman's decision to abort involves, inter alia, one desi-
deratum-she does not want to become the parent of the fetus within
her.70 It is more probable than not, therefore, that the abortion deci-
sion is coupled with an at least implicit renunciation of parental
rights and relinquishment of parental responsibilities. Despite the
awesome duties imposed upon parents by the state,7 it should be
emphasized that a child who survives abortion need not force a
woman into parenthood. The same considerations that support
woman's right to decide whether to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy are broad enough to support her decision to terminate
unwanted parenthood."
Unless a woman decides that she wants parenthood," the living,
aborted, unwanted child is without protection and should properly
come within the parens patriae jurisdiction of the state. 4 At the very
least it would be grossly inequitable for any state to arbitrarly exclude
aborted children merely because of the manner in which they were
born. Thus, if there is any vitality to the doctrine of parens patriae,
it should at least stand for the proposition that all children come
under its protection.7 5
Ill. FETAL RESARCH
The growing use of fetal life in medical and scientific experimenta-
tion has precipitated legal, medical and ethical dilemmas which are
welfare; 4) children whose welfare is endangered by their environment. Campbell, The
Neglected Child, 4 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 631, 633-34 n.9 (1970).
' See, e.g., Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961); Raleigh
Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
7 But cf. 38 Fed. Reg. 31742 (1973), HEW Draft Working Document regarding the
protection of human subjects, wherein the draftsmen recognize that the pregnant
woman who consents to abortion may still have an interest in the fetus she carries.
;' See text accompanying note 65 supra.
7 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
7 This decision should be open to pregnant women before and after abortion. But
see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-311 (Supp. 1973), which mandates that children
surviving abortions become wards of the state; the mother and the father who con-
sented to the abortion have no parental rights. See also S.D. CODE ANN. § 34-23A-18
(Supp. 1974), which makes the circumstances of an abortion resulting in a live birth
material evidence in a proceeding to terminate parental rights.
1' See note 68 supra and accompanying text; IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-133(C) (Burns
Supp. 1973), providing that if the mother and father have denied in writing any desire
to keep the child born live from an abortion, such child shall become a ward of the
welfare department of the county. See also id. § 113(b) (children born live automati-
cally issued birth certificate).
71 See text accompanying notes 144-48 infra.
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yet to be resolved." Fetal research was instrumental in producing
polio vaccine and could prove useful in conquering viral disease, can-
cer, birth defects and mental retardation." Proponents charge that
attempts to prohibit such research jeopardize the health and well-
being of future generations."8 Opponents reject the utility theory, the
salient point of their objection being that medical progress should not
come at the expense of the living human fetus, whether it is inside
or outside the uterus.79
Though fetal research is not a Roe phenomenon, controversy sur-
rounding it has surfaced in the wake of that decision. Abortion is not
at issue, but it is abortion which produces the embryos and fetuses
who are the sine qua non of fetal research. Since the decision in Roe
v. Wade, intrauterine and extrauterine life each enjoy a different
status under the law.8° Thus, in any discussion of fetal research a
distinction must be made between in utero and ex utero experimenta-
tion. Both concepts will be discussed seriatim.
76 See, e.g., Goldstein, Fetal Research in the Balance, 10 TRiL 153 (July-Aug. 1974)
(hereinafter cited as Goldstein]; Randall, Fetal Studies Challenged, Washington Star
News, July 19, 1974, § A, at 1, col. 1; 15 MED. WORLD NEWS, Feb. 8, 1974, at 57; 14
MED. WORLD NEWS, Oct. 5, 1973, at 32; NEWSWEEK, June 24, 1974, at 74.
" Behrman, The Importance of Fetal Research, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1974, § IV, at
17 col. 2; Dukes & Czapek, Regulations and Legislation Concerning A bortus Research,
229 J.A.M.A. 1303 (1974); Goldstein, supra note 76; NEWSWEEK, June 24, 1974, at 74.
" Behrman, The Importance of Fetal Research, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1974, § E, at
17, col. 2. The author lists two medical achievements made possible by research on
the human fetus and the newborn: amniocentesis (see notes 95-97 infra) and the
development of the Rh-blood group incompatability test. He predicts that progress in
the following areas will be hindered if fetal research is restricted: prevention of prema-
ture birth and brain injury from asphyxia occuring during labor; the prevention and
treatment of coronary adult heart disease; and the prevention and treatment of certain
disorders of the central system.
It has also been charged that a ban on fetal research will threaten the supply of polio
vaccine which is prepared from human fetal diploid cells or monkey kidney cells. Day,
Pediatricians Fear Ban on Fetal Research, 15 Med. Tribune, June 5, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
", See remarks of Dr. Andre Hellegers, a professor of obstetrics at Georgetown Uni-
versity and director of its Kennedy Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction and
Bioethics. Cohn, Scientists and Fetus Research, Washington Post, Apr. 15, 1973, § A,
at 6, col. 5.
Dr. Mildred F. Jefferson fears the abuses of utilitarianism which will result from
-adherence to the premise that what is useful is good. Additionally, she believes that it
is medically unethical to experiment on the live fetus because it cannot give informed
consent, and a mother is then deprived of her right to change her mind about abortion
at the last minute. Interview with Dr. Mildred F. Jefferson, Assistant Clinical Profes-
sor of Surgery at Boston University Medical School, in Boston, Aug. 9, 1974.
1* A fetus in utero is not considered a person under the fourteenth amendment, and
thus is not entitled to fourteenth amendment protection. 410 U.S. at 158-59. However,
when the fetus is born, he or she becomes a citizen and is then entitled to all the
corresponding rights and privileges. See note 141 infra.
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A. In Utero Experimentation
Unlike postnatal experimentation, prenatal experimentation is
neither legitimized through the ritual of obtaining informed consent
from the participant, nor generally governed by any code of ethics.8 '
For obvious reasons the fetus cannot consent to experimentation on
itself, and so it is the pregnant woman who gives consent. If it is
recognized that some type of coercion is influential in any
investigator-subject transaction, a complicated epistemological ques-
tion inheres-how educated, how voluntary, how informed is in-
formed consent? 2 Moreover, in view of the state's legitimate interest
in potential human life, recognized in Roe,83 and the state's interest
in the health of future generations, recognized in Buck v. Bell,84 it is
S See Ayd, Fetology: Medical and Ethical Implications of Intervention In The Pren-
atal Period, 169 ANNALS OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 376, 377 (1970). The
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, in conjunction with the National
Institute of Health, has appointed a special study group to review policies and proce-
dures for the protection of human subjects involved in human experimentation, in
particular, children, prisoners and the institutionalized mentally infirm. This study
group has completed a draft working document which includes a comprehensive defini-
tion of informed consent:
K. Informed consent has two elements: comprehension of adequate information
and autonomy of consent. Consent is a continuing process. The person giving
consent must be informed fully of the nature and purpose of the research and of
the procedures to be used, including identification of those procedures which are
experimental, the possible attendant short or long term risks and discomforts, the
anticipated benefits to himself and/or others, any alternative methods of treat-
ment, expected duration of the study, and of his or her freedom to ask any
questions and to withdraw at any time, should the person wish to do so. There
must also be written evidence of the process used for obtaining informed consent,
including grounds for belief that the subject has understood the information given
and has sufficient maturity and mental capacity to make such choices and formu-
late the requisite judgment to consent. In addition, the person must have suffi-
cient autonomy to choose, without duress, whether or not to participate. Both the
comprehension of information and the autonomy of consent are necessary ele-
ments; to the extent that either of these is in doubt, the adequacy of informed
consent may be in doubt.
38 Fed. Reg. 31740 (1973). See also notes 149-55 infra and accompanying text.
" See Ingelfinger, Informed But Uneducated Consent, 287 N.E.J. OF MED. 465
(1972), wherein the author states that coercion inheres when volunteers are induced
to participate in experiments "by hopes of obtaining better grades, earlier parole, more
substantial egos, or just mundane cash." Id. at 466.
Ingelfinger charges that under present research conditions, informed consent is not
educated consent. "When a man or woman agrees to act as an experimental subject
• . . his or her consent is marked by neither adequate understanding nor total freedom
of choice." Id. at 466.
83 410 U.S. at 159, 163.
- 274 U.S. 200 (1927). In Buck, the Court ruled that the state could forcibly sterilize
individuals who were found to be genetically mentally defective and probably
capable of passing this mental defect on to another generation. Id. at 205-06. Despite
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questionable whether a pregnant woman's consent sufficiently legi-
timizes nontherapeutic prenatal experimentation on the fetus.
1. Drugs
When experimentation involves injecting new drugs into the fetus
via the pregnant woman,8 5 both the investigator and the woman may
be informed as to the nature of the proceeding, but no one knows with
certainty how the drug will affect the fetus. Thus the possibliity
remains that because of the harmful effects of the drug, Roe's "poten-
tial life" will never achieve "meaningful" life outside the womb.8
Because of this possibility, it is highly unlikely that any life-
endangering experiments would be conducted upon a wanted fetus.
Attitudes differ, however, when pregnant women have made the
abortion decision.87 According to one researcher, Dr. Leonard Berman
of Boston City Hospital, "[i]f an abortion is the termination of preg-
nancy to the detriment of the fetus, then what does it matter what is
done to it before abortion?" 8 Dr. Andre Hellegers, Director of the
Kennedy Institute for Study of Human Reproduction and Ethics, has
analogized this attitude to the Nazi approach: "[I]f it's going to die
you might as well use it.""
Assuming the validity of Berman's premise, it makes no practical
difference what happens to a fetus before an abortion. Under Roe, the
fetus is a nonperson, representing only potential human life.98 It has
the seemingly oppressive nature of the sterilization statute, the Court held that the
statute was a legitimate exercise of state police power and was reasonably necessary
to protect the mental health of future generations. Id. at 203, 207. However, the oppres-
sive nature of the sterilization procedure was perhaps ameliorated because of the
procedural safeguard of a hearing requirement. Id. at 206-07.
For an enlightening discussion of where Buck may ultimately lead, see Kindregan,
State Power Over Human Fertility And Individual Liberty, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1401
(1972).
See, e.g., Nyhan, The Influence of Drugs, in PREMATURITY AND THE OBSTETRICIAN,
312-27 (D. Cavenagh & M. Talisman eds. 1969); Vaheri, Isolation of Attenuated
Rubella-Vaccine From Human Products of Conception and Uterine Cervix, 286 N.E.J.
MED. 1071 (1972); 14 MED. WORLD NEWS, Oct. 5, 1973, at 36.
81 Cf. Eriksson, Catz & Yaffe, Drugs and Pregnancy, 16 CUN. OB. & GYN. 199, 213-
23 (1973).
11 E.g., Philipson, Sabath & Charles, Transplacental Passage of Erythromycin and
Clindamycin, in 288 N.E.J. MED. 1219 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Philipson]. The
authors report on their experimentation with aborted fetuses before and after abortion.
One of the drugs administered to the mothers for the purpose of seeing how much
would be absorbed by the fetus was erythromycin. Id. at 1219. The Food and Drug
Administration has now issued a warning to all physicians regarding the toxicity of this
drug. Use of erythomycin involves a definite risk of liver toxicity and jaundice. See also
Goldstein, supra note 76.
Harvard Crimson, May 8, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
" Boston Phoenix, Apr. 24, 1973, at 12, col. 1.
gg 410 U.S. at 158, 162.
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no legal personality and thus is not entitled to fourteenth amend-
ment protection.' Any property, tort or miscellaneous rights it might
possess are contingent upon livebirth12 However, Berman's premise
is faulty. Abortion is the termination of pregnancy, but if it is per-
formed after viability, it does not necessarily have to be detrimental
to the fetus.9 3 Moreover, it would be a non sequitur to conclude that
because the fetus has no right to legal life, it therefore has no right
to be free from experimentation.
Because the state has a legitimate interest in the fetus qua poten-
tial life, it does make a difference that harmful drugs are injected into
about-to-be-aborted fetuses, particularly viable fetuses. When viabil-
ity occurs, the distinction between actual human life and potential
human life depends solely upon whether the fetus remains in utero.
'1 Id. at 158-59. For the rationale as to why fetuses have no legal personality, see note
23 supra. However, it is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Douglas, who agreed with
the majority in denying legal personality to the unborn fetus, has a different opinion
regarding inanimate objects. In his dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972), while addressing himself to the issue of standing, he argued that since ships
and corporations have legal personalities, so too should valleys, rivers, beaches, and
even air, through people with meaningful relations thereto. Id. at 742 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
11 410 U.S. at 162. But see Chrisafogeoris v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d
88 (1973), a post-Roe case in which the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a viable
unborn fetus is a person within the meaning of that state's Wrongful Death Act,
notwithstanding the fact that the baby boy in question was born dead. The plaintiff
in this case, while in her thirty-sixth week of pregnancy, was struck by an automobile
driven by the defendant. It was determined that her unborn infant died from injuries
sustained by the plaintiff when she was hit. Since the court found that the unborn eight
month old fetus was viable at the time of the injury, id. at 372, 304 N.E.2d at 90, the
plaintiff-mother was allowed to recover for the wrongful death of her child born dead
as a result of injuries negligently inflicted upon him while in utero. Id. at 374, 304
N.E.2d at 91; accord, Libbee v. Permanente Clinic,__ Ore. -, 518 P.2d 636, 637,
640 (1974), rehearing denied, Ore. -, 520 P.2d 361 (1974). For a collection of
pre-Roe cases which allowed an action for damages for the wrongful death of a viable
fetus born dead, see Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 992 (1967). See generally Note, The Law and
the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349,
354-360 (1971). Since the decision in Roe, seven district courts have held that the word,
"child" in the context of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970) includes
the unborn child, and thus a state policy which withholds Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children benefits from pregnant women until the birth of their children is invalid
under the supremacy clause. Wisdom v. Norton, 372 F. Supp. 1190, 1192 (D. Conn.
1974); Carver v. Hooker, 369 F. Supp. 204, 215 (D.N.H. 1973); Stuart v. Canary, 367
F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (W.D. Ohio 1973); Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123, 126 (W.D.
Ind. 1973); Harris v. Mississippi State Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 363 F. Supp. 1243, 1296-
97 (N.D. Miss. 1973); Doe v. Lukhard, 363 F. Supp. 823,828-29 (E.D. Va. 1973); Alcala
v. Burns, 362 F. Supp. 180, 184 (S.D. Iowa 1973). But see Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp.
51, 54 (N.D. Fla. 1974) and Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620, 623-24 (N.D. Ga. 1973),
wherein state policy decisions which excluded unborn children from such benefits were
sustained.
13 See Tribe, supra note 8, at 4 n.24.
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Therefore, whether the state has the power to prohibit in utero experi-
mentation does not or should not depend upon whether the fetus has
any constitutionally protected rights. As aptly noted by John Hart
Ely:
It has never been held or even asserted that the state interest needed to
justify forcing a person to refrain from an activity, whether or not that
activity is constitutionally protected, must implicate either the life or
the constitutional rights of another person. Dogs are not "persons in the
whole sense," nor have they constitutional rights, but that does not mean
that the state cannot prohibit killing them .
2. Amniocentesis
Another form of experimentation, of particular significance in light
of Roe, is the procedure of anmiocentesis, which even when performed
under ideal conditions can be hazardous to both mother and fetus."
In this procedure the amniotic sac surrounding the fetus is punctured
and amniotic fluid is withdrawn." By cytological and biochemical
examination of this fluid, prenatal diagnosis of certain inherited dis-
orders is possible.97 If diagnosis is available, physicians have time to
prepare the necessary therapy for the fetus. However, when accurate
diagnosis is in doubt or when no therapy exists, abortion is the sug-
gested alternative to a "defective" child. 8
The growing use of amniocentesis as a procedure, the results of
which will determine whether or not abortion should be performed,
mandates the need for a clear and precise definition from the Su-
preme Court on what "health" really means." If amniocentesis, fol-
lowed by abortion, is performed prior to viability, Roe acknowledges
the woman's desire not to bear a defective child as a value outweigh-
ing any interest the state might have in the continued in utero exist-
ence of this potential, albeit defective, life. Difficulty arises, however,
when amniocentesis is performed subsequent to viability, that is,
" Ely, supra note 17, at 926 (emphasis original).
13 Ayd, supra note 81, at 378.
TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDIcAL DiCrIONARY A-64 (12th ed. 1973).
'7 Fuchs, Genetic Information From Amniotic Fluid Constituents, 9 CLIN. OB. &
GYN. 565, 571-72 (1966); Jacobson & Barter, Intrauterine Diagnosis and Management
of Genetic Defects, 99 AMER. J. OB. & GYN. 796, 804 (1967); Nadler, Role of Amniocen-
tesis in the Intrauterine Detection of Genetic Disorders, 282 N.E.J. MED. 596 (1970).
For a discussion of the complications and possible dangers to mother and fetus arising
out of this procedure, see Queenan, Role of Rho (D) Immune Globulin in Induced
Abortion, 14 CUN. Oa. & GYN. 235, 240 (1971); Rajan, Amniotic Fluid Assays In High
Risk Pregnancy, 16 CUN O. & GYN. 313, 324 (1973).
11 See Levin, Oxman, Moore, Daniels & Scher, Diagnosis of Congential Rubella In
Utero, 290 N.E.J. MED. 1187, 1188 (1974); Randall, Fetal Studies Challenged, Wash-
ington Star News, July 19, 1974, § F, at 1, col. 1.
" See note 42 supra.
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when the state's interest in potential life has reached the compelling
point.00 At that point Roe permits the state to proscribe abortion
"except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother." Not wanting a child is insufficient justification for a Roe
post-viability abortion.0 2 Unless the knowledge that the fetus will be
born in some way defective creates a Roe "health" reason, the state
can prohibit post-viability abortions of defective children. Thus, the
logical and simple course for women desirous of removing viable,
defective fetuses from their wombs, is to transform the unwanted,
defective child into a health problem.'2 For example, women could
argue that the very thought of carrying a genetically defective child
causes them mental distress.
B. Ex Utero Experimentation
1. Dead Aborted Fetuses
Ex utero experimentation with dead fetuses is somewhat analogous
to ante mortum donation of body tissue or organs which is now gov-
erned by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which has been enacted
in forty-eight states and the District of Columbia. 04 Though much
410 U.S. at 163.
Id. at 164.
102 See id. at 163-65. However, as a practical matter both pre- and post-viability
abortions are performed precisely because the mother does not want the child. The
medical indications which formerly might warrant abortion, i.e., toxemia of preg-
nancy, diabetes, high blood pressure, pulmonary tuberculosis, acute rheumatic fever
and congenital heart defects, have greatly decreased with modern methods of treat-
ment. Decker, Medical Indications for Therapeutic Abortion: An Obstetricians View,
50 MINN. MED. 29, 30 (1967). See also Mecklenburg, The Indications for Induced
Abortion: A Physician's Perspective, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 37-48 (T. Hilgers
& D. Horan eds. 1972).
103 At this point it seems that post-viability abortion becomes indistinguishable from
homicide, infanticide or feticide. Unless "quality-of-life" jurisprudence fully displaces
the traditional western ethic of "value-of-life" jurisprudence, it may well be a nonjusti-
fiable homicide, infanticide or feticide action. See note 161 infra for a discussion of the
difference between a quality-of-life and value-of-life ethic.
104 ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 184(4) (Cum. Supp. 1973); ALASKA STAT. § 13.50.010 (1972);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-841 (Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-410.4 (Cum. Supp.
1974); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7150 (Deering Cum. Supp. 1973); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 91-9-1 (Supp. 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-139a (1969); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 24, § 1780 (Cum. Supp. 1970); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-271 (1973); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 736.20 (Cum. Supp. 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-401 (1974); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 327-1 (Supp. 1973); IDAHO CODE § 39-3401 (Supp. 1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 551
(1973); IND. ANN. STAT.1 29-2-16-1 (Burns 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 142A.1 (Supp.
1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3209 (1972); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.185 (1972); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2901 (Cum. Supp. 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 140 (1971);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 113, § 7 (Cum. Supp. 1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
328.261 (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.921 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 49-39-1 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.210 (Vernon 1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
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could be done to render the Act more lucid,"°' it is arguable that ex
utero experimentation with dead fetuses comes within its purview.
Fetuses are precluded from donating but not from being donated. 0°
Only "actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent," will
prevent execution of the gift. 107 Clearly, fetuses are incapable of giving
notice, actual, apparent, express or implied. Thus, it would appear
at first blush that the Act is one solution to whatever legal questions
inhere with ex utero experimentation.
Closer analysis, however, suggests the contrary conclusion. The
primary purpose of the Act was to facilitate transplantation, not
experimentation. 0° Additionally, since ex utero experimentation is
69-2315 (1970); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-4801 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.500 (1973);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291-A:1 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6-57 (Supp. 1974);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-11-6 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4300 (McKinney
1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-220.1 (Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.1-01 (1970);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.01 (Baldwin 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2201 (1971);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 97.250 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 8601 (Spec. Pamphlet 1972);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-47-1 (Supp. 1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-711 (Cum. Supp.
1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 34-26-20 (1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-4201 (Cum.
Supp. 1974); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4590-2 (Cur. Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §
26-26-1 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5231 (Cum. Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 32.364.3 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 1 § 68-08.500 (Supp. 1972); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 16-19-1 (1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 155.06 (Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-
221.1 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
"I See Groll & Kerwin, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act: Is the Right to a Decent
Burial Obsolete?, 2 LOYOLA U.L.J. 275, 290-300 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Groll &
Kerwin], for an enlightening discussion of the problems caused by lack of clarity in
the Act, e.g., failure to provide a standard by which the donor's soundness of mind
can be established, id. at 292; conflict with Mortmain Statutes, id. at 293; failure to
require that donors other than the decedent possess sound mind, id. at 295; difficulty
in preventing an anatomical gift, id. at 295-97.
,*1 Section 2(a) of the Act states who may execute an anatomical gift.
Any individual of sound mind and 18 years of age or more may give all or any
part of his body for any purposes specified in Section 3, the gift to take effect upon
death.
However Section 2(b) provides that when "persons in prior classes are not available
at the time of death," either the spouse, an adult son or daughter, either parent, an
adult brother or sister, a guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of his death,
or any other person authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body may give all
or any part of the decedent's body for medical use. The word "decedent" includes a
stillborn infant or fetus. Id. § 1(b).
107 Id. § 2(b).
' See Groll & Kerwin, supra note 105, at 290-91; Richards, Medical-Legal Problems
of Organ Transplantation, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 77, 95 (1969). There is indeed a difference
between experimentation and transplantation. Hellegers, Using Fetus After Abortion,
Ob. Gyn. News, May 15, 1974, at 38, col. 1. Dr. Hellegers distinguishes between
abortion, experimentation and transplantation ethics. In response to those who would
oppose transplanting thymus from an aborted fetus to a newborn on the grounds that
no systematic profit should be derived from a systematic, albeit, justified evil, Dr.
Hellegers maintains that the situation is analogous to using a murder victim's kidneys
for transplantation. Certainly such action is in no way an approval of the murder. Id.
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often performed in conjunction with in utero experimentation and is
adjunctive 'to abortion, it is really sui generis. 0° Five jurisdictions
which have enacted the Act treat ex utero experimentation with dead
aborted fetuses as outside the purview of the Act: Two specifically
prohibit it and three allow it with maternal consent."'
However, consent is the critical issue where aborted fetuses are
concerned. Under the Act, next of kin are permitted to consent to the
ante mortum donation of their relatives' bodies,"' presumably be-
cause they would have the interests and best known wishes of the
deceased at heart."' But the more complicated question, debated in
the Unted States Senate, is-who has the interests of the dead
aborted fetus at heart?"3 Even more important is the question of
whether the dead aborted fetus has any legitimate interests at all.
Logically, the proper party to consent to the donation of the
aborted fetus should be the person or authority who has custody of
it."4 However, the question of custody poses a dimensionless inquiry.
Does the aborted dead fetus belong to the state, thereby vesting the
state with authority to consent to experimentation upon it? In Massa-
chusetts, the courts have the statutory authority to order that the
bodies of executed murderers be delivered to medical schools for
dissection." 5 Query whether such authority should be extended to
include the bodies of aborted fetuses? Should the natural mother who
has exercised her legal right to consent to abortion be granted the
additional right to donate to medicine that which is removed from her
body after an abortion? When this question was raised in the United
States Senate, Senator James Buckley of New York maintained:
"I One type of reported experimentation involves injection of drugs into the fetus
before an elective abortion. After being aborted the fetus is dissected, its tissue is
homogenized and scientists are then able to study the effects of the drug. See, e.g.,
Philipson, supra note 87.
"0 For statutes which completely prohibit ex utero experimentation, see ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 81-11 (Supp. 1974) (pathological examination permitted); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 10-112 (Burns Supp. 1973) (also permits pathological examination). Massachu-
setts, South Dakota and Vermont allow ex utero experimentation with dead fetuses.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (Supp. 1974) (need mother's consent); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (Supp. 1974) (need mother's consent); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 5224(a) (Supp. 1974) (consent of one parent required).
... UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT § 2(b).
"' See Hellegers, supra note 108, at 39.
" See 119 CONG. REC. 16,347-48 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1973) (remarks of Senators
Kennedy and Buckley).
"' As a general rule, there is no property right in a dead body. The right of possession
of a decedent's remains devolves upon next of kin. Leno v. St. Joseph Hosp., 55 Ill. 2d
114, 117, 302 N.E.2d 58, 59 (1973); O'Dea v. Mitchell, 350 Mass. 163, 164, 213 N.E.2d
870, 872 (1965); Sheehan v. Commercial Travelers' Mut. Accident Ass'n., 283 Mass.
543, 553, 186 N.E. 627, 631 (1933). See generally Note, The Nature of the Right in a
Dead Body, 24 HARV. L. REV. 315 (1911).
113 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 113, § 6 (Supp. 1974).
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However problematic may be the case of maternal consent in the case
of natural aborticn, the one case that is clear is that the mother who is
willing to kill her child in abortion is not the proper party to consent to
any experimentation."'
Perhaps no one can properly give consent, and death with dignity is
the only alternative." 7 However, in light of the provisions of the Act,
death with dignity for anyone, including dead aborted fetuses, may
well be an antiquated right.
2. Living Fetuses
In September 1971, an advisory council to the National Institute
of Health (NIH) urged the use of fetal life for research because
"planned scientific studies of the human fetus must be encouraged
if the outlook for maternal and fetal patients is to be improved.","
In March 1972, the National Child Health and Human Development
Council issued guidelines for studies involving the human fetus and
reaffirmed approval because "scientific studies of the human fetus
are an integral and necessary part of the research concerned with the
health of women and children.""' Under the aegis of NIH, live fetal
research continued without interruption until it became public
knowledge in April 1973.120 Controversy ensued over the use of live
fetuses in federally financed medical research, and on April 12, 1973,
NIH withdrew its support because it could not scientifically justify
research on living human fetuses when identical studies could be
performed on animals.' 2'
"'. 119 CONG. REC. 16,348 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1973) (remarks of Senator Buckley).
"7 Id. (remarks of Senator Kennedy). However, death with dignity seems like an
anomolous right for aborted fetuses.
" 1 REPORTER ON HUMAN REPRODUCTION AND THE LAW A-47 (1973). This group recom-
mended that the living fetus be artificially sustained for research only if it met two of
the following criteria: The fetus must not be beyond twenty weeks gestation, nor weigh
more than five hundred grams body weight nor be more than twenty-five centimeters
in length measured from crown to heel. Id. at A-48.
I Id. The proposed guidelines are as follows:
1. In all cases, applicable state and/or national laws shall be binding.
2. Guidelines for human investigation used to protect the rights of minors and
other helpless subjects are applicable.
3. The study protocol must be reviewed and approved by the appropriate na-
tional review committee to insure that the rights of the mother and fetus are fully
considered.
(a) It is the duty of these committees to insure that the investigators shall not be
involved in the decision to terminate pregnancy, the product of which is used for
study within his own research grant or authority.
(b) Continuing review by the institutional committee must be undertaken in all
projects.
4. Informed consent must be obtained from the appropriate party (ies).
Id. at A-47 to A-48.
' See Washington Post, Apr. 13, 1973, § A, at 1, col. 5.
121 Washington Post, Apr. 15, 1973, § A, at 6, col. 7.
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On August 16, 1973, President Nixon signed into law a bill barring
the use of National Science Foundation funds for research on "a
human fetus which is outside the womb of its mother and which has
a beating heart.""'2 The bill, limited in time,' 3 met with severe disap-
proval from the fetal research community.' 4 A special study group
appointed by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
through NIH has published a draft working document which effect-
ively precludes HEW approval of substantial risk research upon abor-
tuses who have the capacity to sustain heartbeat and respiration.125
2 Pub. L. No. 93-96, § 10(2) (Aug. 16, 1973).
'2 The law applied to the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974. Id. § 1.
24 See, e.g., 14 MED. WORLD NEWS, Oct. 5, 1973, at 32, 36. One fetal researcher, Dr.
John Morris, Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Charles R. Drew Postgrad-
uate Medical School in Los Angeles describes fetal research legislation as reflecting an
odd mixture of religious prejudice, unrealistic politics and a failure to understand the
necessity of such studies. Id.
'1 38 Fed. Reg. 31,738 (1973). In the document, an abortus is defined as
a fetus when it is expelled whole . .. prior to viability. This definition, for the
purpose of this policy, excludes . . . fetal material which is macerated at the time
of expulsion, a dead fetus, and isolated fetal tissue or organs excised from a dead
fetus.
Id. at 31,739-40. It also provides for regulations governing research on the abortus and
the fetus in utero:
2. Special categories. - (a) The Abortus
No research, development, or demonstration activity involving the non-viable
abortus shall be conducted which:
1. Will prolong heart beat and respiration artificially solely for the purpose of
research;
2. Will of itself terminate heart beat and respiration;
3. Has not been reviewed by the agency Ethical Review Board; and
4. Has not been consented to by the pregnant women with participation of a
Protection Committee.
(b) The fetus in utero
No research involving pregnant women shall be conducted unless:
1. Primary Review Groups assure that the activity is not likely to harm the
fetus;
2. the agency Ethical Review Board has reviewed the activity;
3. a Protection Committee is operating in a manner approved by the agency
and
4. the consent of both prospective legal parents has been obtained, when reason-
ably possible.
Id. at 31,738. Compare id. at 31,738 which provides:
An abortus having the capacity to sustain heart beat and respiration is in fact a
premature infant, and all regulations governing research on children apply,
with id. at 31,741:
An investigator proposing research activities which expose children to risk must
document as part of the application for support, that the information to be gained
can be obtained in no other way. The investigator must also stipulate either that
the risk to the subjects will be insignificant, or that although some risk exists, the
potential benefit is significant and far outweighs that risk. In no case will research
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Prior to the public publication of this draft working document,
Senator Buckley introduced an amendment to the National Research
Service Awards and Protection of Human Subjects Act' 6 which
would prohibit HEW from funding any experimentation on a living
human fetus prior to, during or after an induced abortion.' Although
he emphasized that his amendment was divorced from the abortion
controversy,' 2 it was limited in application to the induced abortion
situation. The limitation seems arbitrary, yet Buckley's rationale is
based on what he considers the extreme vulnerability of induced
aborted fetuses:
It is the children who are aborted in the elective abortion situation who
constitute the largest class of human guinea pigs now given over to the
practitioners of the black arts of a perverted science. Condemned to
death by their mothers, removed by physicians from their life support
systems, such children are now being subjected to the inhuman indignity
of becoming grist for the experimenter's mill. '
Concerned with the restrictive nature of Buckley's amendment, Sen-
ator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts introduced an amend-
ment which would ban the use of HEW funds for live fetal research
until regulations governing the conduct of such research could be
established.'30 On September 11, 1973, the Senate voted in favor of
Kennedy's amendment to Buckley's amendment' 3' and the bill is now
law. 132
3. The Living Aborted Fetus-Organ or Human Being
The source of the medical dilemma surrounding live fetal research
activities be approved which entail substantial risk, except in the case of clearly
therapeutic procedures in which the benefit to the patient significantly outweighs
the possible harm.
126 H.R. 7724, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), now Pub. L. No. 93-348 (July 12, 1974).
"7 See 119 CONG. REC. 16,344-45 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1973). The proposed Buckley
amendment to H.R. 7724 read as follows:
Sec. 1205. The Secretary may not conduct or support research or experimenta-
tion in the United States or abroad on a living human fetus or infant, whether
before or after induced abortion, unless such research or experimentation is done
for the purpose of insuring the survival of that fetus or infant.
Id. at 16,345.
121 Id. at 16,344-45.
129 Id.
'3' Id. at 16,348.
121 Id. at 16,350 (yeas-53; nays-35; not voting-12). The bill was then sent to confer-
ence and the conference report provided for a four month ban on the conduct or support
of research on a living fetus or infant before or after an induced abortion. H.R. REP.
No. 1148, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
02 Act of July 12, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 188 Stat. 342.
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is the status of the living aborted fetus'3 3 and the doctrine of informed
consent.' 3 The situation may be viewed as a confrontation between
the ethics of utilitarianism and humanitarianism.'3 5
Fetal researcher Dr. Jerald Gaull maintains that it is better to
obtain useful information from fetuses than dispose of them in incin-
erators.' 36 With similar reasoning, Dr. Kurt Hirschhorn of Mount
Sinai Hospital in New York argues that since aborted fetuses are like
removed organs it is only logical to make use of them.' 3 However, Dr.
Andre Hellegers does not share Dr. Hirschhorn's opinion. He consid-
ers the living aborted fetus as representative of human life and rejects
the proposition that it is proper to experiment on human beings who
are about to die.' 38
Experience suggests what can occur when medical science is di-
vorced from ethical obligations towards persons approaching death.'39
The author suggests that notwithstanding the medical dilemma
about whether living aborted fetuses are human beings, persons or
organs, live fetal reasearch is too much like the Nazi experimental
situation for anyone to feel comfortable about it."'
4. The Living Aborted Fetus and the Law
There should be no question regarding the legal status of the living
aborted fetus. Simply stated, the genesis of constitutional personality
is birth per se.'4 ' To establish a "wanted" birth as the criteria for
'1 But see 38 Fed. Reg. 31,738 (1973) (the abortus who is able to sustain heartbeat
and respiration should be considered a premature infant).
I" See notes 81-82 supra and note 149 infra and accompanying text for a discussion
of the doctrine of informed consent and its applicability to premature infants.
' Cf. notes 78-79 supra.
Gaull's experimentation involves removing the brain, liver, lung and kidneys
from aborted fetuses while their hearts are still beating. Washington Post, Apr. 15,
1973, § A, at 1, col. 3.
"I National Observer, Apr. 21, 1973, at 4, col. 1.
In Id.
"'See United States v. Greifelt, 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MIrrTAY TRIBUNAL UNDER CONTROL COUNSEL LAW No. 10 (U.S. Government Printing
Office).
"I See, e.g., Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 N.E.J. MED. 39
(1949) [hereinafter cited as Alexander], for a vivid account of experimentation per-
formed upon Nazi prisoners who were about to die. See also W. SHIRER, RISE AND FALL
OF THE THIRD REICH 979-91 (1960).
"' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The first clause of the fourteenth amendment is self-
explanatory: "All persons born ... in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside." There-
fore, once born, a person is endowed with constitutional personality and is thus entitled
to the full gamut of constitutional protection. Furthermore, it has never been disputed
that birth per se is the sole prerequisite for United States citizenship, provided that
birth occurs within this country's jurisdiction. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 37, 73 (1873) (purpose of first clause of the fourteenth amendment was to confer
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determining what is tissue and what is a premature infant is irra-
tional. Whether the fetus is aborted in the first or third trimester is
not determinative of any rights it might possess. Under present law,
if there is evidence of independent circulation or breathing, livebirth
has occurred and the living aborted fetus is a "person born" under
the fourteenth amendment.'4 2 Quality of life is not a fourteenth
citizenship on members of the Negro race), overruling Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393, 411 (1857) (persons of African descent held not to be citizens of the
United States or any state); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898)
(child born in the United States of parents of Chinese descent becomes a citizen of
United States at the time of his birth, despite fact that parents are subjects of the
Chinese Emperor). See Terada v. Dulles, 121 F. Supp. 6, 10 (D.C. Hawaii 1954)
(Congress is without power to unilaterally expatriate a citizen or to restrict the effect
of birth which alone is sufficient to acquire citizenship under the fourteenth amend-
ment); Ex parte Hing, 22 F.2d 554, 556 (D.C. Wash. 1927) (native born citizen who
married an alien ineligible for citizenship cannot be deprived of citizenship unless
substantial evidence exists to prove the fact of marriage to an alien).
"' See, e.g., People v. Hayner, 300 N.Y. 171, 90 N.E.2d 23 (1949), and State v.
Osmus, 73 Wyo. 183, 276 P.2d 469 (1954), which support the majority view that inde-
pendent circulation is a prerequisite to live birth and thus part of the corpus delicti
for infanticide. In Hayner the court of appeals found that the corpus delicti had not
been established,
[flor the People were bound to establish . . . that the child was born alive in
the legal sense, that is, had been wholly expelled from its mother's body and
possessed or was capable of an existence by means of a circulation independent
of her own ....
People v. Hayner, supra at 174, 90 N.E.2d at 24. In Osmus, the defendant was con-
victed of manslaughter for killing her newborn infant. Since the court was unable to
determine whether her child had independent circulation, it was unable to find that
live birth had occurred and the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed her conviction.
State v. Osmus, supra at 218-21, 276 P.2d at 483-84.
But see Bennet v. State, 377 P.2d 634, 635-36 (Wyo. 1963) (breathing was sufficient
evidence of livebirth); People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 626, 176 P.2d 92, 94
(1947) (viable child, even if still in process of birth, is human being). See generally
Atkinson, Life, Birth and Live-Birth, 20 L.Q. Rlv. 134, 141-56 (1904); Note, Proving
Live-Birth in Infanticide Cases, 17 Wyo. L.J. 237, 242 (1965).
Heretofore, the question of live birth has arisen only in infanticide cases. However,
since Roe, several states have liberally construed the definition of live birth as it arises
in the abortion situation. See, e.g., ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1576 (Supp. 1973)
which provides in pertinent part:
"[Llive birth," . . . shall mean a product of conception after complete expul-
sion or extraction from its mother, irrespective of the duration of the pregnancy,
which breathes or shows any other evidence of life such as beating of the heart,
pulsation of the umbilical cord or definite movement of voluntary muscles,
whether or not the umbilical cord has been cut or the placenta is attached ....
Accord, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40.254.1 (Supp. 1974). See also MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 112, § 12J (Supp. 1974) (life in fetus to be determined by same standards, whether
in utero or ex utero); MINN. STAT. § 145.421(3) (Supp. 1974) (slightest evidence of vital
signs sufficient for classification as "living").
In six other jurisdictions, statutes have been enacted which provide that live born
fetuses are to be treated as persons: IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-113(b) (Burns Supp. 1973)
(birth certificate required; failure to take reasonable steps to preserve fetus' life results
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amendment criterion. Vita is still vita even if it is not la dolce vita!'43
Since deformed, mentally retarded and prematurely born infants
have never been considered less than "persons," it is, at the very
least, logically inconsistent to deny similar status to the living
aborted child. Classifications which deny this status are based on
suspect criteria and can only result in denial of the most fundamental
of rights without due process.' Additionally, denying aborted pre-
mature infants the medical care given premature infants' raises
serious equal protection problems, particularly invidious discrimina-
tion in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson"' and Shapiro v.
in civil and criminal liability); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.254.1 (Supp. 1974) (birth
certificate required); ME. RFv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1575-76 (Supp. 1973) (civil and
criminal liability imposed for failure to take reasonable steps to preserve fetus' life);
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4164 (McKinney Supp. 1974) (birth certificate and medical
records required; aborted child is entitled to legal protection under the penal code);
S.D. CODE § 34-23A-16 (Supp. 1974) (birth certificate required); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-7-311 (Supp. 1973) (child surviving abortion becomes a ward of the state).
143 But see Byrn, Abortion-on-Demand: Whose Morality?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1,
25 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Byrn], wherein the author maintains that under a
quality-of-life ethic results would differ. Professor Byrn views abortion as a valuable
instrument for preserving quality machines because it destroys the least functional
members of society whose existence threatens the efficient operation of the machine.
Id.
"I Recent judicial affirmation that persons may not be deprived of their property
without due process of law, see, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972);
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1968), should support the conclusion
that aborted children cannot be deprived of their lives without due process of law,
since, most arguably, on the scale of rights life would take precedence over property.
"I Standard care for nonaborted premature infants includes being placed in a warm
incubator and then being transported from the delivery room to a premature nursery
where all essential therapeutic and diagnostic equipment are available. D. MARLOW,
TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRIC NURSING (1969). However, in many instances the aborted pre-
mature infant rests in a quagmire. The sensitivity of attending medical persons deter.
mines whether the aborted infant goes to incinerator or incubator. Byrn, supra note
143, at 32; see Wilson, Who Will Live, Who Will Die?, Boston Globe, Nov. 5, 1973, at
17, col. 6. But see IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-113(a) (Burns Supp. 1973), which provides that:
all abortions performed after a fetus is viable shall be. . .performed in a hospital
having premature birth intensive care units available during the abortion, and all
viable fetuses shall be given full medical treatment for the protection and mainte-
nance of their life.
See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-4149 (Supp. 1973) (commonly accepted means of care
to be employed if aborted child alive with any chance of survival); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-7-310 (Supp. 1973) (physician performing abortion to use all skills in maintaining
life of fetus sufficiently developed to have any reasonable chance of survival). See
generally Chan & McDermott, Abortion and Acute Identity Crisis in Nurses, 128 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 952, 953-55 (1972).
I' 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In Skinner the Court considered the constitutionality of an
Oklahoma statute which prescribed compulsory sterilization for persons who had
thrice been convicted of felonies involving moral turpitude. Since the fundamental
right to procreate was involved, the Court subjected this statutory classification to
strict scrutiny and found that it resulted in invidious discrimination. Id. at 541.
Clearly, when aborted children are classified differently than nonaborted children and
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Thompson '47 form. However, an extensive equal protection discussion
is beyond the purview of this Note. In view of the Court's benevolence
towards illegitimate children,'48 it would no doubt be as particularly
solicitous if presented with a case involving the rights of aborted
children.
5. Informed Consent and the Death Decision
Under present law an individual can qualify as a test subject only
when, having been clearly informed of the intent, nature and inherent
risks of the procedure, he or she voluntarily agrees to participate. 49
When the minors are involved, courts have generally adhered to the
common law rule that parental consent is a necessary prerequisite for
medical treatment.' 50 Although the common law rule is not without
statutory exceptions,' 5' the basic consideration, in all cases, is
thus deprived of basic medical care necessary to their survival, their fundamental right
to life is adversely affected. Such discrimination is equally, if not more, invidious than
that involved in the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act. See Karst,
Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-
Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 716, 735 (1969).
Perhaps a state could justify classifying aborted children as nonpersons and thus not
entitled to the right to life and necessary medical care by adverting to the financial
burden such children would cause as wards of the state. Another possible justification
is that the mothers of aborted children do not want them to receive any medical care.
Yet, these can hardly be labeled as substantial justifications for depriving aborted
children of the right to live.
117 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (state objectives may not be accomplished by means
which result in invidious discrimination and denial of fundamental rights).
"I See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (state may not invidiously
discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits ac-
corded children generally); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972)
(illegitimate children must share equally with other children in recovery of
workmen's compensation benefits for death of their parent); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68, 70-72 (1968) (fourteenth amendment does not permit a state to deny illegiti-
mate children right of action for wrongful death of parent).
" C. KRAMER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 14-19 (1972). Any unauthorized procedure is
considered a battery, and if the subject is conscious, an assault. Bonner v. Moran, 126
F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941). Personal immunity and not the nature of the procedure
is controlling. Conceding that many procedures are in fact harmless, one court has
stated, "if we admit such an encroachment upon the personal immunity of an individ-
ual, where in principle do we stop?" Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 652, 16
A.2d 80, 90 (Ct. Cl. 1940).
The doctrine of informed consent is not peculiar to American courts. It was articu-
lated by the AMA in 1946, reaffirmed at Nuremberg in 1947, by the FDA in 1962, by
the Helsinki Declaration in 1966 and by the HEW in 1972. Mitford, Experiments
Behind Bars, ATLANric, Jan., 1973, at 64, 67. Though practice falls short of the ideal,
this doctrine has never been contradicted in principle. See Annot., 76 A.L.R. 562
(1932); Medical Ethics and Human Subjects, 104 Sci. NEWS 20 (1973).
"I See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (parental consent
needed for surgical operation).
"' One criticism of the common law rule is that it has the effect of denying medical
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whether the proposed treatment is for the benefit of the minor and
performed for the purpose of saving his or her life or limb. 5 ' With the
advent of organ transplantation, however, the courts were forced to
reexamine the common law rule, which seemed to lose its raison
d'etre once minors were excluded from participating in a decision
which would ultimately deprive them of vital organs.' Thus, in situ-
ations where minors have been potential organ donors, courts have
been particularly cautious in protecting their' rights and have made
detailed findings on the issue of informed consent of the minor.5 4
While none of the organ transplant cases thus far have involved in-
fant minors, a question once speculated as purely academic is now
real - who can consent to nonbeneficial procedures upon infants,'55
particularly, premature infants, born via abortion?
That experimentation on living aborted fetuses provides no benefit
to them admits of no question. Death is not merely a risk but a
result.' Thus, unemancipated, unable to understand the nature and
consequences of experimentation, unable to give any form of consent,
the aborted child does not fall under the conventional mosaic of the
informed consent analysis. Since experimentation is generally legi-
timized through the consent of the natural mother, it becomes imper-
treatment to minors who are most in need of it. Thus, most of the statutory exceptions
to the common law rule deal with pregnancy-related and venereal disease treatment.
See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 577 A-1, A-2 (Supp. 1973) (except for abortion, minors
between ages of 14-17 years do not need parental consent for medical care relating to
pregnancy or venereal diseases); MoNT. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 69-6101 to 6104 (Supp.
1974) (except for abortion and sterilization, minors' self-consent is sufficient to author-
ize treatment for pregnancy, communicable diseases and drug problems). See gener-
ally 7 SusTOLx U.L. REv. 1157, 1167-68 (1973).
152 Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1941); see Younts v. St. Francis
Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, 301, 469 P.2d 330, 337 (1970).
'" See generally Curren, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation In Minors,
34 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 891, 892 (1959).
"I' Id. See also Camitta v. Fager, Equity No. 73-171 (Mass., Sept. 5, 1973), which
involved a bone marrow transplant from a thirteen year old donor to his fifteen year
old brother who had severe aplastic anemia. The donor was considered by some physi-
cians to be mentally retarded and/or schizophrenic. Both the donor and his father
consented to the operation. However, the doctors and the hospital were unwilling to
proceed for two reasons: first, the proposed transplant was not being performed for the
donor's benefit; second, the quality of the donor's consent was questionable. Id. at 2.
The parents, hospital and physicians petitioned the court for a declaratory judgment.
A guardian ad litem, psychiatrist, psychologist and neurologist submitted reports to
the court indicating that the donor would suffer no serious harm from the procedure.
Based on the medical reports and the consent of both parent and donor, the court
authorized the bone marrow transplant. Id.
15 Curren, supra note 153, at 895.
'5 Although it can be argued that experimentation merely hastened what would be
inevitable death, there is always the possibility that if live aborted fetuses were given
the same medical care afforded premature nonaborted fetuses, note 145 supra, the
living aborted fetus would survive. See note 192 infra.
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ative to consider whether her right to consent is a logical extension
of the right, granted to her in Roe, to terminate pregnancy'57 or
whether this right exists at all.' 8 The dispositive question is whether
parents may exercise over their children the awesome jus vitae
necisque [right over life and death] vel non.'59
For all practical purposes the Supreme Court has already decided
this issue as far as the unborn child is concerned. Although Roe never
gave women the right to destroy, it did give women the right to abort,
and under current birth technology, particularly in the first two
trimesters, abortion usually results in destruction.' 0 Analysis is not
so simplistic when the issue is the born child because some observers
consider "quality-of-life" as determinative of a parent's right to make
the death decision.' 6' While recognition of such a right seems prepos-
"1 410 U.S. at 153-54, as Roe was a logical extension of Eisenstadt and Griswold.
See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
SR Dr. Andre Hellegers maintains that:
[t]o ask a mother who is seeking abortion to consent to an experiment on the
abortus is meaningless. It would be like asking consent from a parent who had
abandoned or battered a child. To me, it's like a Nazi saying "Since we're going
to put all those Jews in the gas chamber anyway, let's get some good out of them
by doing medical experiments first."
14 MED. WORLD NEWS, Oct. 5, 1973, at 32, 36. But see remarks of Dr. Joshua Lederberg,
professor of genetics and human biology at Stanford University, who considers Dr.
Hellegers' argument as "logically consistent but wrong." Id. According to Dr. Leder-
berg, "[iunformed consent is not an ethical doctrine in itself, but a means to an end
- a way a person can be subjected to an experiment, consistent with his humanity
and individuality." Id.
'' In Maine Medical Center v. Houle, Civil No. 74-145 (Cumberland Co. Sup. Ct.,
Me., Feb. 14, 1974), parents of a severely handicapped child asked the hospital to halt
life-saving support and forego corrective surgery. An injunction was granted to the
hospital by the superior court judge who held that parents had no right to withhold
life-saving support from their defective child. See Boston Sunday Globe, Feb. 17, 1974,
at 4, col. 2. But see Campbell & Duff, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-
Care Nursery, 289 N.E.J. MED. 890 (1973), wherein it is reported that forty-three
parents agreed to withdraw medical support from their defective children, resulting in
the death of the infants in each instance. To date, no criminal action has been com-
menced against either the parents or the hospital.
'" But see Pakter, supra note 51, at 290, wherein it is reported that in New York
during the period from July 1 to December 31, 1970, eighteen second trimester live
births occurred after saline abortions.
,' See Shaw, Doctor, Do We Have A Choice?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1972, § 6
(Magazine), at 44. Quality-of-life may be defined as an ethic which places relative
value on human life. A New Ethic For Medicine and Society, supra note 21, at 67. Life
is considered to have quality only when certain criteria are met, e.g., "minimal intellig-
ence, self-awareness, self-control, . . *. the capability to relate to others, concern for
others, communication, control of existence, curiosity, change and changeability, bal-
ance of rationality and feeling. ... Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme
Court On Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 807, 860 (1973). Quality-of-life is diametrically
opposed to traditional western ethic which places absolute value on every human life,
and it has been suggested that it is "something which becomes possible for the first
time in human history because of scientific and technologic development." A New
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terous to this author, proponents find it a modus vivendi. It has been
suggested that since the present system allows some parents to exer-
cise the jus vitae necisque, legal status should be withheld from in-
fants until three days after birth so that all parents could have this
right. "'62 It has been further suggested that parents of mongoloid chil-
dren not only have the right but the responsibility of exercising the
jus vitae necisque. 13 British author Glanville Williams, who analog-
izes an eugenic killing by a mother to a bitch's killing of deformed
puppies, maintains that since no one can definitely label the former
act immoral, freedom of choice should prevail."6 4
Certainly, if "quality-of-life" is determinative of parental rights,
the response to the original inquiry would be that parents have the
right to decide whether their children (mongoloid, deaf, dumb, blind)
will live or die. The breadth of such a mandate would necessarily
encompass a woman's right to consent to nontherapeutic experimen-
tation upon her living aborted children.
However, the right of privacy, recognized in Roe, which may result
in the termination of the unborn child's life, is simply not broad
enough to mandate similar results when that child is born alive. By
reason of its livebirth, that child becomes a citizen and therefore
cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. 6 ' If parents may
decide whether their children will live or die, then parental consent
becomes the equivalent of due process, and, at the very least, the
underlying rationale of the common law rule is perverted. 6 However
desirable such a right would be for some parents, the sentiments
expressed in Prince v. Massachusetts' 67 negate its possible existence
under present law:
Parents may be free to be martyrs for themselves. But it does not follow
that they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their
children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion
Ethic For Medicine and Society, supra note 21, at 67. But see Bym, Abortion-on-
Demand: Whose Morality?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAw. 5, 38, citing F. WERTHAM, A SIGN FOR
CAIN: AN EXPLORATION OF HUMAN VIOLENCE 160 (1966), for the proposition that quality-
of-life ethic derives from K. BUNDING & A. HOcHE, THE RELEASE OF THE DESTRUCTION
OF LIFE DEVOID OF VALUE (1920), a book written by two prominent German scientists
who proposed the killing of worthless people. The book was reportedly very influential
in the formation of Nationalist Socialist policy.
6 National Right to Life News, Nov. 1973, at 10, col. 2 (remarks of Nobel Prize
winner Dr. James Watson).
113 Shaw, Doctor, Do We Have A Choice?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1972, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 44.
164 G. Wim -Ms, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 20 (1957).
165 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See note 141 supra.
" See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941), for a discussion of the
rationale behind the common law rule.
167 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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when they can make that choice for themselves." 8
Arguably then, the response to our initial inquiry would be that
women do not have the right to consent to nontherapeutic experimen-
tation upon their living, aborted children simply because, under pres-
ent law, parents do not have the right to decide whether their children
will live or die.
IV. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The ultima ratio of communal life is and has always been the compul-
sory, vicarious sacrifice of individual lives.'
In what has been labeled "technologic totalitarianism,"' 70 human
beings steadily continue to replace guinea pigs, rats and chimpanzees
in experiments ranging from simple drug tests to hazardous mind
control surgery.' 7' The situation has led one physician to charge that
"an incredible orgy of human experimentation . . . has engulfed the
American medical community."'72 Thus public concern has intensi-
fied as the thumbscrews of pressure are applied to persons, who be-
cause of their condition, are unable to resist.' In the wake of Roe,
fetuses have been added to the list of subjects, and fetal research is
now a controversial spectacle in the arena of human experimentation.
If, according to one trend of thought, "[a] fetus is no more a
human being than an acorn is an oak,"'' 7 there is no ethical problem
with nontherapeutic experimentation upon living fetuses, whether
intra-or extrauterine. Therefore, absent any antivivisection senti-
ments, there would be no more objection to dissecting a live fetus
than to dissecting a frog.
I" Id. at 170.
Jonas, Philosophical Reflections On Experimenting with Human Subjects, 98
DAEDALUS 219, 223 (1969).
'7* A Clockwork Orange in a California Prison, 101 ScL NEws 174 (1972).
171 Mitford, Experiments Behind Bars, ATLNmrc, Jan., 1973, at 64.
'" M. GROSS, THE DOCTORS 287 (1966). The author urges that the Nuremberg rules
governing human experimentation be revised in order to meet "the current experimen-
tal orgy." Id. at 308.
171 See Cons As Guinea Pigs, TmE, March 19, 1973, at 45 (prisoners); Medical Ethics
and Human Subjects, 104 Sci. NEws 20 (1973) (sick patients); Human
Experimentation, 14 ME. WORLD NEWS, June 8, 1973, at 37 (children).
" Roberts, Anti-Abortionists Try To Deny Women A Fundamental Civil Right,
Boston Globe, June 24, 1974, at 21, col. 6. However, Dr. Roberts argues that even if
the fetus is human, it was proper to legalize abortion because anti-abortion laws
allowed fetuses to enjoy more rights than any other human beings. Id. She reaches this
conclusion without explanation or discussion of what rights fetuses did enjoy. Nonethe-
less, the logic in Dr. Robert's argument seems somewhat suspect considering that the
only right bestowed upon fetuses by anti-abortion laws was the nebulous right to be
born.
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However, fetuses should not be so automatically excluded from the
human race. Without trying to resolve Roe's difficult question of
deciding when human life begins,"' or attempting to define life itself,
it is difficult to deny that the fetus is a being and that it "is human
if only because it may not be characterized as not human ... .
Labeling the fetus a human being is not inconsistent with the Court's
decision in Roe to refuse to grant it legal personality. 7 7 Therefore,
fetal research does present a serious ethical dilemma for those who
do-include the fetus in the human race. Where research involves using
one human being for the benefit of another it is necessary to ask
whether potential, beneficial medical discoveries should take preced-
ence over the principle of protecting human dignity and human
rights.'
The purpose of fetal research has been variously articulated: to
help the unborn who will not be aborted; 179 to preserve the right to
life by curing disease;'" to guarantee mothers the right to have nor-
mal children; and to assure living children the right to be free of birth
defects.' 8' Utopia is an admirable goal. A society without disease is
as desirable as a society without war; but cutting up live aborted
fetuses to improve the health of wanted fetuses smacks of the same
illogic as that which justified dropping napalm on Vietnamese chil-
dren so that Southeast Asia would enjoy peace, or dissecting live
prisoners by the Nazis so that their own military forces would be
benefited. 8 In the final analysis, how we treat those who are about
"' See 410 U.S. at 159. Roe stated that it need not resolve this question since
medical, philosophical and theological experts were unable to reach any consensus. Id.
However, Roe did engage in speculation by determining when life did not begin. See
note 21 supra.
"I' Byrn v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 199, 286 N.E.2d 887, 888,
335 N.Y.S.2d 390, 392 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973). In Byrn, the New
York court of appeals upheld a law permitting abortion but stated:
It is not effectively contradicted, if it is contradicted at all, that modem biological
disciplines accept that upon conception a fetus has an independent genetic "pack-
age" with potential to become a full-fledged human being and that it has auton-
omy of development and character although it is for the period of gestation depen-
dent upon the mother . . . and it is unquestionably alive.
Id. Thus, the least that can be said with certainty is that the fetus is genotypically
human.
'" See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
"' See Human Experimentation, 14 MED. WoRLD NEWS, June 8, 1973, at 37 passim.
Washington Post, Apr. 15, 1973, § A, at 1, col. 3 (remarks of fetal researcher Dr.
Jerald Gaull).
11* Behrman, The Importance of Fetal Research, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1974, § 4, at
17, col. 2.
" Hay, The Right of Mothers To Have Normal Children, Boston Globe, June 21,
1974, at 19, col. 2.
"' Alexander, supra note 140. The author herein relates the details of an experiment
designed to show the effects of explosive decompression on Nazi military forces. After
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to die-the terminally ill, the prisoners on Death Row, the fetuses
who will be aborted and the fetuses who survive abortion-may well
be a measure of our humanity.'13
V. NEED FOR LEGISLATION
A. In Utero Experimentation
The seriousness of the situation created by in utero experimenta-
tion should not be minimized. One writer has predicted that experi-
ments on prenatal life will greatly increase in the future.', Addition-
ally, if equating correlation with causation is a legitimate method of
interpreting data, it is submitted that the Court's sanction of abor-
tion, which for all practical purposes sanctions abortion-on-
demand, 185 should logically result in an increased number of potential
experimental subjects. However, the right to abort should not be
construed as a license to expose developing fetuses to unneccessary
harm.8 6 Nevertheless, absent state regulations through prohibiting
legislation, in utero experimentation will continue.
Apart from the question of whether the unborn fetus is a human
being, and notwithstanding Roe's decision that it is not a legal per-
son, the unborn fetus is legally recognized as representing at least
subjecting the victims to such decompression, S.S. Doctor Sigmund Rascher dissected
them while their hearts were still beating. Id. at 42-43. At first blush it may seem that
this analogy is an overreaction to live fetal experimentation. However, living aborted
fetuses are genotypically human. They differ only phenotypically from the Nazi prison-
ers. Homogenizing and dissecting bodies, severing heads (see note 208 infra) and re-
moving brains, livers, lungs and kidneys of live aborted fetuses (see note 136 supra)
should affect the sensitivity of at least those observers who consider the dissection of
live Nazi prisoners shocking.
'3 See text accompanying notes 139-40 supra.
'u Ayd, supra note 81, at 380.
" Despite Mr. Chief Justice Burger's assertion that the Court rejects "any claim
that the Constitution requires abortion-on-demand," 410 U.S. at 208, abortion-on-
demand is the logical result of the Court's holding. During the first trimester, abortion
is clearly an on-demand situation and during the second trimseter abortion may also
be obtained upon demand. At the point when the fetus becomes viable and during the
third trimester, a woman need only assert a "health" reason, and abortion must then
be performed upon her "demand." See notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
' See 38 Fed. Reg. 31,742 (1973):
Respect for the dignity of human life must not be compromised whatever the age,
circumstances, or expectation of life of the individual. Therefore, all appropriate
procedures providing protection for children as subjects in biomedical research
must be applied with equal rigor and with additional safeguards to the fetus.
The recent decision of the Supreme Court on abortion does not nullify the
ethical obligation to protect the developing fetus from avoidable harm. This obli-
gation . . . requires that no experimental procedures entailing risk to the fetus
be undertaken in anticipation of abortion.
Accord, Report of the Advisory Group on The Use of Fetuses and Fetal Material For
Research, 1972 THE LANcir 1223.
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potential human life.' 7 Recognizing the state's interest in potential
human life'18 and in the health of future generations,' 9 this Note
suggests that there is a serious need for legislation prohibiting all
forms of in utero experimentation which may adversely affect this
interest.
Despite the efforts of some physicians to insure that the viable
aborted fetus is not born alive,'8 0 livebirth often results from abor-
tion.'"' Thus, if a post-viability abortion is performed, the fetus may
be born alive with at least a theoretical chance of survival.'92 Addi-
tionally, it is possible, although improbable, that after making the
abortion decision and after harmful drugs have been injected into the
fetus, a woman may change her mind and decide against the abor-
tion.9 3 At this point the damage already may have been done.
Apart from the question of whether prohibiting legislation would
be a valid exercise of state police power"' and would satisfy the re-
quirements of due process, 95 it is necessary to consider whether such
legislation would infringe upon a "fundamental" right.'" Assuming
"1 410 U.S. at 163.
" Id.
"' Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
" Symposium: A Report on Prostaglandins for Abortion, 2 CONTEmPORARY OB. &
GYN., Dec. 1973, at 83, 101. Dr. Gerald Anderson, Associate Professor of Obstetrics and
Gynecology at Yale University School of Medicine, fears that dealing with "live
aborted fetuses can lead to a rebellion by the nurses that could ruin the program." Id.
He is trying to find a compound which could be administered intra-amniotically which
would decrease the possibilty of a live birth. To date, he has found only one, methotrex-
ate, which he belives would not be approved by the F.D.A. Id.
" Id. See also notes 51 & 56 supra.
192 The probability of survival depends upon whether the aborted fetus is disposed
of or given the same medical care as nonaborted fetuses. Routine care for premature
infants is discussed in note 147 supra. Usually, aborted fetuses who survive are placed
for adoption. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1973, at 29, col. 6 (saline abortion of 33
week male fetus, weighing 4 pounds 8 ounces at birth now being placed for adoption);
2 CONTEMPORARY Oa. & GYN., Dec. 1973, at 83, 102.
' The draft working document of HEW regarding the protection of human subjects
provides that since women have the right to change their mind about abortion, "no
experimental procedures entailing risk to the fetus [shall be] undertaken in anticipa-
tion of abortion." 38 Fed. Reg. 31,742 (1973).
"' Under the two-pronged test of Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1893), such legisla-
tion would be a legitimate exercise of police power if "[tihe interests of the public
generally . . . require [it] and . . . the means are reasonably necessary for the accom-
plishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive upon individuals." Id. at 137.
"I See, e.g., Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525, 536-37 (1949), wherein the Court stated that legislation satisfies the requirements
of due process if it does "not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibi-
tion, or of some valid federal law .... " Id.
-9 Fundamental rights are those which are either explicitly guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, such as voting, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 544 (1964), or those which
the Court has gleaned from the wording of the Constitution, such as interstate travel,
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arguendo that the right of personal privacy granted in Roe v. Wade
is broad enough to allow a pregnant woman to consent to experimen-
tation upon the fetus she has conceived and carries, it will become
necessary to balance this right against the state's interest in potential
life and the health of future generations. Unlike the abortion situa-
tion, no serious economic, psychological or physical hardships are
imposed upon women themselves by favoring the latter interest.'7
The only possible "detriment" which would be imposed upon preg-
nant women if they could not exercise such a right, would be a denial
of a right to have unlimited control of one's body. This argument
lacks merit, however, if one accepts the biological reality that two
bodies are involved in pregnancy. Furthermore, relying on Buck v.
Bell" and Jacobson v. Massachusetts,'9 the Roe Court rejected the
assertion that "one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as
one pleases. ... 0
In any event, legislation prohibiting in utero experimentation does
not have to be justified by a compelling state interest, simply because
a woman's right to make the decision to consent to experimentation
is neither fundamental nor within the ambit of the Roe right of per-
sonal privacy. Roe recognized that pregnant women "carry an embryo
and later a fetus . . ." and thus "cannot be isolated in . . . pri-
vacy." 0' 1 Towards that end, Roe bestowed upon pregnant women a
right which was not unqualified but rather was limited to merely
removing the fetus from her uterus.9 2 The right to consent to removal
has no relation to the right to consent to experimentation, and the
underlying rationale which supported the Court's justification for
granting the former fails to support the latter.3
0 3
The right to consent to in utero experimentation is not susceptible
to analysis under a Roe-type balancing test. Additionally, it is not
necessary to "resolve the difficult question of when life begins, 2 4 in
order to determine at what point the state has the authority to pro-
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969). Thus, in determining whether a
particular activity is fundamental, resort must be had to the Constitution. San Anto-
nio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 (1973). Governmental classi-
fications which infringe upon fundamental rights will be subjected to strict scrutiny,
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and will be held
constitutionally infirm absent a showing of a compelling state interest. Shapiro v.
Thompson, supra at 627.
" But results may differ where the research scientist is concerned. Hardships may
be imposed upon them if they are prohibited from engaging in fetal experimentation.
98 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding sterilization of insane persons).
" 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (upholding compulsory smallpox vaccination for adults).
410 U.S. at 154.
" Id. at 159.
22 See text accompanying notes 45-52 supra.
"3 See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
410'U.S. at 159.
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scribe in utero experimentation. For whether the fetus is a mass of
disorganized cells0 5 or a "living human individual, '"2 6 no one would
deny that it represents at least the potentiality of life.0 7 Thus, the
state's legitimate and important interest in potential life with regard
to its authority to proscribe in utero experimentation must begin
from the moment of conception.
B. Ex Utero Experimentation
Though ex utero experimentation is conducted in antiseptic sur-
roundings, it bears the gruesome indicia of reported infanticide
cases.2 0 In addition, the live aborted fetus personifies the ultimate
"discrete and insular" minority.209 This Note suggests that there is an
urgent need for legislation prohibiting substantial risk experimenta-
tion upon the living aborted fetus unless such experimentation is
conducted to benefit the experimental subject. 10 If this is a restric-
tion upon the freedom of scientific inquiry, it is a necessary restriction
20 Alan F. Guttmacher, former head of Planned Parenthood World Population has
opined that the fetus "is simply a group of specialized cells .... " Symposium -
Law, Morality and Abortion, 22 RtrGERS L. REv. 415, 436 (1968).
2 Brief for Appellants at 9, Markle v. Abele, 411 U.S. 940 (1973), quoting Affidavit
of Dr. Micheline Mathews-Roth of the Department of Microbiology and Molecular
Genetics at Harvard University.
217 In Roe the Court stated that the fetus represents only the potentiality of life. 410
U.S. at 163.
m In Britain some aborted fetuses are sold to research labs and kept alive indefi-
nitely. Boston Phoenix, April 24, 1973, at 1, col. 3. Some are homogenized and centri-
fugized. 223 J.A.M. A. 143 (1973). See also 14 MED. WORLD NEWS, June 8, 1973, at 21
(heads of aborted living fetuses severed); 14 MzD. WORLD NEws, May 11, 1973, at 41
(liver and thymus glands removed); 173 SciENCE 829 (1971) (cerebral cortex removed
in dissection). If "the unborn knows perfectly well when he has been hurt, and he will
protest it just as violently as would a baby lying in a crib," H. LILEY, MODERN
MOTHzRHOOD 50 (rev. ed. 1969), the pain experienced by aborted (born) children makes
Goethe's comment apposite: "Opfer fallen heir,/ Weder Lamm noch Stier,/ Aber
Menschenopfer unerhoert." ("Victims do fall here,/ Neither lamb nor steer,/ Nay, but
human offerings untold."), quoted in Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on
Experimenting with Human Subjects, 98 DAEDALus 219, 223 n.4 (1969).
20 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding congres-
sional power to prohibit interstate shipment of adulterated milk). In a footnote, Mr.
Justice Stone opined that the Court may give extraordinary protection not only to
those interests expressed in the Constitution, but also those interests which are un-
likely to receive sufficient consideration in the political process, particularly the inter-
ests of "discrete and insular minorities" who cannot form viable political organiza-
tions. Id. at 153 n.4.
-~' The following jurisdictions prohibit all experimentation on live fetuses: Califor-
nia, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska and Utah. See CAL.
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 25956 (a) (West Supp. 1974); LA. REv. STAT. § 14:87.2
(Supp. 1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1574 (Supp. 1974); MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (Supp. 1974); MrNN. STAT. § 145.422(1) (1973); NEB. Rzv. STAT.
§ 28-4, 161 (Supp. 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-312 (Supp. 1973).
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and is based upon the same ethic which precludes nontherapeutic,
substantial risk experimentation upon all children."' The fetus who
survives abortion is a citizen under the fourteenth amendment. 21 2
That he or she may live only a few days, hours or even minutes is
irrelevant. Civil rights are not bestowed in proportion to one's life
span.
Let it not be underestimated what is at stake. Those who success-
fully protest live fetal research must live with the consequences and
may perhaps even die from diseases which such research might have
eradicated. Legislation prohibiting live fetal research may stifle med-
ical progress which could improve the health of future generations.
However, if we indulge in the assumption that future generations can
only be improved by the compulsory sacrifice of lives-in-being, there
is little cause for complacency among those who find themselves be-
tween infancy and senility.
VI. CONCLUSION
Roe v. Wade removed the stigma of illegality from abortion, mak-
ing that act a private matter."3 However, the Court's rationale for
making abortion a private matter becomes less apodictic when the
issues are fetal destruction and experimentation. There is really noth-
ing private about the latter two.
By not stating how far the right to privacy extends, the Supreme
Court has left open avenues for both advance and retreat. With re-
gard to fetal destruction, the Court can rationally pull back and
refuse to extend privacy coverage, it can remain mute or it can signifi-
cantly expand privacy to include that decision. A choice of the latter
alternative would necessitate resolution of the question of when life
begins, a question which by the Court's own admission is a difficult
one. Until the Court can answer this question with medical, moral
and legal certainty, it is most appropriate for it to pull back and
apply its privacy brakes.
Fetal experimentation is another matter. It has little to do with
privacy and even less to do with the considerations confronting the
Court in Roe. However, it seems that Roe catalyzed the issue, precipi-
tating dimensionless inquiries. Reduced to simple terms, the problem
is one of whether fetuses in utero and ex utero ought to be treated as
human and thus protected by codes of ethics governing human exper-
imentation in general. The problem is compounded by the fact that
fetal experimentation is adjunctive to abortion, and the controversy
surrounding it is therefore like old wine in a new bottle. Roe gave
I 38 Fed. Reg. 31,740-41 (1973).
2" See note 143 supra.
" 410 U.S. at 154.
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pregnant women a specific and limited right-to remove unwanted
fetuses from their uteri. The Roe decision does not nullify the ethical
obligation to protect living fetuses, in utero and ex utero, from avoid-
able harm. It is time for all legislatures to fulfill that obligation.
Jacqueline Nolan Haley
